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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SUMMARY 
BLUESTEIN v. SKINNER: FAA'S RANDOM 
DRUG TESTING UPHELD IN "SAFETY-
SENSITIVE" JOBS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Bluestein u. Skinner,l the Ninth Circuit upheld Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations requiring random 
drug testing of several categories of employees in the private 
commercial aviation industry.2 The court rejected petitioners'3 
arguments that the regulations violate the fourth amendment' 
and are arbitrary and capricious in violation of section lO(e) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.1i 
1. Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Norris, J.; the other panel 
members were Canby, J., and Chambers, J. concurring), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3561 
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1991) (No. 90-735). 
2. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. 
3. Petitioners included commercial aviation industry employees who are subject to 
the drug testing, the industry labor organizations and an organization of aviation em-
ployees and employers. Id. at 454. 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part: "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons. . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause 
5. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1990). The Administrative 
Procedure Act 10(e) provides in pertinent part: "The reviewing court shall - (2) hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be - (a) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; ... " 
73 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FAA REGULATIONS 
On November 21, 1988 the FAA issued a rule6 reqUIrIng 
commercial air carriers7 and air traffic contr.ol facilities8 to per-
form random drug testing on their employees.9 Employees in 
several categories must be tested. 10 Tests for marijuana, cocaine, 
opiates, phencyclidine (PCP) and amphetamines must be 
performed. 11 
The regulations require employees to be randomly selected 
for testing, using computer generated numbers or a random 
number table that is matched with an employee's social security 
number, payroll identification number, or any other FAA-ap-
proved method. 12 After the first year of testing, employers must 
randomly test at least 50 percent of the employees annually in 
the job categories listed above. 13 
6. 53 Fed. Reg. 47024 (1988) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121 and 135) 
(1990) (final rule Nov. 21, 1988). In an advance notice of proposed rule making (Decem-
ber, 1986), the FAA first proposed random drug testing. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 
14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 135) (1990). After receiving hundreds of written comments, the 
FAA issued a notice of proposed rule making (March 1988). Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. 
See 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121, 135)(1990). Written comments were then filed in re-
sponse to this notice, and the FAA held a series of public hearings. Bluestein, 908 F.2d 
at 453. On Nov. 21, 1988 the final rule was issued. [d. 
7. [d. This included those carrying passengers or cargo, scheduled or unscheduled. 
[d. 
8. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453, n.2. 
9. [d. at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I - defining "employer" generally as 
all Part 121 and 135 certificate holders, i.e., commercial air carriers, both scheduled and 
unscheduled, carrying passengers or cargo, or an air traffic control facility except those 
operated by, or under contract with, the FAA or the U.S. military). 
10. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. Those tested include: a) flight crew members; b) 
flight attendants; c) flight (or ground) instructors; d) flight testing personnel; e) aircraft 
dispatchers; f) maintenance personnel; g) aviation security or screening personnel; and h) 
air traffic controllers. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I, III). 
11. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990) (App. I, IV). 
12. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 ~990). 
13. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1990). The procedure for test-
ing employees involves the employee arriving at a "collection site" with photographic 
identification, removing any coat or outer garment, then entering a stall and providing 
the required urine specimen. Bluestein, at 454. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1990). A monitor of 
the same gender as the employee must remain in the area, but outside the stall. Blues-
tein, 908 F.2d at 454. The monitor inspects the specimen for temperature, volume and 
color, and must then have it shipped to an HHS-certified drug testing laboratory. [d. 
The laboratory to which the specimen is sent performs an immunoassay test; if it is 
positive, a second test is done to confirm the positive test. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454. 
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Employees who cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for a 
test that has been confirmed as positive must be removed from 
their positions.14 They may only return to duty upon the recom-
mendation of a Medical Review Officer11i or the Federal Air 
Surgeon. 16 
B. JUDICIAL HISTORY 
Upon the FAA's issuance of the rules, petitions for review 
were filed in the Fifth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit by commercial aviation employees, the industry's labor 
organizations, and an organization of aviation employees and 
employers.17 The petitions were consolidated m this 
proceeding.18 
Petitioners claimed that the drug testing regulations are un-
reasonable searches in violation of the fourth amendment.19 
Also, petitioners argued that the FAA failed to give a satisfac-
tory explanation for its decision to require random drug testing, 
therefore violating section lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 20 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE 
In analyzing the potential fourth amendment violation, the 
Ninth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Na-
tional Treasury Union v. Von Raab21 and Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives Association. 22 
The regulations also require pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, testing at 
certain employees' first medical examinations, testing based on reasonable cause, and 
testing after returning to duty following a positive test or a refusal to test. [d. at 453-54 
n.3. 
14. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454. 
15. [d. The employee's Medical Review Officer must be a qualified physician. [d. 
16. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. See supra note 4 for language of fourth amendment. 
20. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1990) (reproduced in part, supra note 5). 
21. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989). The Court upheld a Customs Service random drug test-
ing program. Id. 
22. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). The Court upheld railroads testing those employees in-
3
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In Von Raab, the Court upheld a United States Customs 
Service requirement that employees competing for promotions 
or transfers to particular positions submit to urinalysis.23 In 
Skinner, the Court upheld a Federal Railroad Administration 
program requiring that railroad companies perform blood and 
urine tests on train workers involved in major railroad accidents; 
breath and urine testing are permitted of an employee who vio-
lates certain safety rules/014 
In Bluestein, the Ninth Circuit noted that certain threshold 
fourth amendment questions had been answered by Von Raab 
and Skinner/olD First, drug testing, required by government regu-
lations and performed by private employers, is subject to consti-
tutional restrictions.26 Second, urinalysis constitutes a search 
under the fourth amendment because it intrudes upon society's 
reasonable expectations of privacy.27 Third, the standard fourth 
amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause may 
not always apply in the drug testing context.28 
The Ninth Circuit compared the government's need for 
testing U.S. Customs employees in Von Raab to the govern-
ment's need to test aviation personnel in Bluestein and found 
that clearly the FAA rules serve needs "beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement. "29 In both cases, the testing rules were set 
up to deter drug use among employees in either safety-sensitive 
or security-sensitive positions.30 The court also observed that 
both the FAA drug testing rules and those in Von Raab provide 
that the employee's consent is necessary for test results to be 
used in a criminal prosecution of the employee.31 
volved in a train accident or safety rule violation. [d. 
23. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 454. 
24. [d. at 454-55. 
25. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. 
26. [d. See Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-12. 
27. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455 (citing Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1413; accord Von Raab, 
109 S. Ct. at 1390). 
28. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. If a search "serves special governmental needs, be-
yond the normal need for law enforcement," the government's interests must be bal-
anced against the individual's privacy expectations to find whether requiring a warrant 
or probable cause in that instance would be impractical. [d. (quoting Von Raab, 109 S. 
Ct. at 1390). 
29. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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The court next balanced the government's interests against 
the employee's privacy interest.32 The court stated that it was 
primarily guided by Von Raab because, like Von Raab, the FAA 
testing program is random and does not require any level of in-
dividualized suspicion or suspicious activity (e.g., a safety viola-
tion}.33 The Court in Von Raab had reasoned that the govern-
ment's compelling interest in preventing drug use, in positions34 
where it might endanger the Nation's borders or its citizens, out-
weighed the privacy interests of employees seeking promotions 
to such positions. 311 
Applying the Von Raab reasoning, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that government's interest in preventing drug use by em-
ployees in safety-sensitive positions in the aviation industry is at 
least as strong as the interest in preventing drug use by Customs 
officers.36 
In responding to the argument that the FAA failed to show 
a sufficiently high level of drug use in the industry to warrant its 
testing program, the Ninth Circuit observed that in Von Raab, 
the Customs Service testing plan had not been implemented in 
response to any perceived drug problem among their employ-
ees.37 Nevertheless, the Court in that case upheld the testing be-
cause of its deterrent purposes and the potential for grave 
harm.38 The Ninth Circuit noted that the FAA administrative 
record did contain some evidence of drug use by airline employ-
ees.39 The court reasoned that harm caused by an airplane crash 
32.Id. 
33. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 455. In contrast, the drug testing in Skinner was limited 
to employees involved in a safety rule violation or a major train accident. Id. 
34. Id. Customs Service positions subjected to drug testing involved either: 1) direct 
involvement in drug-related law enforcement; 2) a requirement that the employee carry a 
firearm; or, 3) a requirement that the employee handle "classified" material. The Court 
upheld testing in the first two position types and remanded the third category for clarifi-
cation. Id. 
35. Id. at 455-56. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98. 
36. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. 
37. Id. In Von Raab, there was evidence that out of 3,600 employees tested for 
drugs, only five tested positive. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 
1394. 
38. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1395. 
39. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. The evidence showed that a number of pilots and 
other crew members had been treated for cocaine addiction or overdoses; that tests done 
within the industry found drug use by pilots and mechanics; and drugs were present in 
the bodies of pilots in two plane crashes. Id. 
5
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is at least as great as that caused by drug impairment within 
Customs Service employment.4o Therefore, the court concluded 
that the need for the FAA's random drug testing program 
equaled, if not exceeded, that for the program approved in Von 
Raab:u 
Petitioners also contended that the FAA testing program in-
vaded more deeply on privacy interests than the program in Von 
Raab violated the privacy interests of the Customs Service em-
ployees.42 They noted that the FAA allows immediate testing 
(no notice), while the Customs Service program requires at least 
five days' notice and is only triggered by specific events (i.e., ap-
plying for promotions or transfers).4s 
The Ninth Circuit, however, found the provision for random 
testing without notice insufficient to "tip the scales" against the 
FAA drug testing program. 44 The court noted that the reasoning 
of the D.C. Circuit court in Harmon v. Thornburgh,4~ was per-
suasive.4s In Harmon, a Justice Department testing plan was 
upheld that provided for random testing with notice as slight as 
within two hours of the scheduled testing." The D.C. circuit 
concluded that even though the Justice Department testing plan 
was random in nature, that was insufficient to require undertak-
ing a different analysis from that applied by the Court in Von 
Raab.48 The Ninth Circuit asserted that random drug testing in 
particular weighs more heavily (than privacy interests) in view 
of the FAA's rational conclusion that random testing without. 
advance notice will deter drug use more than testing with ad-
vance notice.'e 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 456. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 456-57. 
45. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), reh 'g denied, (Sept. I, 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 865 (1990). The D.C. Circuit court upheld a random urinalysis drug testing program 
so far as testing those employees holding top secret national security clearances. Harmon 
v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
46. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. 
47. [d. See Harmon, 878 F.2d at 486. 
48. Harmon, 878 F.2d at 489. 
49. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. The court noted three other decisions upholding ran-
dom drug testing following Von Raab: American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 
885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (random urine drug testing upheld for Department of 
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The court dismissed the argument that the FAA plan gives 
employers too much discretion. 50 The Ninth Circuit maintained 
that the strict randomness requirements makes certain that no 
employer will have discretion as to which employees should be 
tested.51 Further, employers' discretion in structuring their test-
ing programs will be restricted by collective bargaining and the 
mandatory FAA approval of each employer's plan. 52 
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that the potential 
fourth amendment violation was substantially indistinguishable 
from the fourth amendment issue decided by the Court in Von 
Raab.53 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit rejected petitioners' 
constitutional challenge to the FAA testing program. 54 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT CHALLENGE 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the claim that the 
FAA's decision was arbitrary and capriCious in violation of sec-
tion lO(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act,55 was 
meritless.56 
The court found that the FAA had explained why it chose 
to require random drug testing; there was more evidence sup-
porting the effectiveness of random testing than of non-random 
programs. 57 The court also concluded that the FAA's decision 
that safety interests outweigh privacy interests in this context 
was a reasonable decision, which could not be overruled as arbi-
Transportation employees in positions having a direct impact on public health, safety, or 
national security); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)(upheld the Army's random drug urinalysis of certain of its civilian employees); 
Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (Army's random drug testing on certain 
civilian employees at a chemical weapons plant was upheld.) Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457 
n.8. 
50. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. The court noted the FAA's statement that it will review each employer's 
programs to ensure that discretion is in fact properly limited under each plan. [d. at 457 
n.9. 
53. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1990), reproduced in part supra note 19. 
56. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. 
57. [d. (citing 14 C.F.R. pt 121 (1990». 
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trary and capricious. liS 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the 
FAA's decision to include flight attendants in the drug testing 
program was inconsistent with previous FAA decisions regarding 
on-duty time. liS The court found no conflict between the duty 
time decisions and the inclusion of flight attendants in the drug 
testing program, since the FAA had found no evidence of a cor-
relation between flight attendant duty time and risk to passen-
gers.60 The court noted, however, that impaired performance of 
attendants can at times be a public safety consideration, and 
that the administrative record supported the FAA finding that 
flight attendant positions are in fact safety-sensitive.61 Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the FAA had acted within its authority 
in mandating random drug testing of flight attendants.62 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the FAA's 
random drug testing regulations. The court concluded that the 
agency's decision to require random testing of employees in the 
aviation industry (whose positions affect public safety) was not 
arbitrary and capricious. Random drug testing was shown by the 
FAA to be a greater deterrent against drug use than non-random 
testing. In balancing the government's safety interests against 
the individual's privacy interests, the court upheld the FAA's 
decision that public safety concerns outweighed privacy con-
cerns under these circumstances. 
Carol A. Farmer* 
58. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457. 
59. [d. The FAA duty time decisions denied petitions of flight attendants to estab-
lish safety rules limiting their on-duty time. [d. 
60. [d. at 457. 
61. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457 n.10. Specifically, flight attendants must perform im-
portant safety functions in emergencies, and are also routinely in charge of ensuring 
safely stored luggage and proper closing and locking of airplane doors prior to departure. 
[d. at 457-58 n.10. 
62. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 458. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
HIGH TECH GAYS u. DEFENSE 
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCE 
OFFICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES 
THE CLASS STATUS OF HOMOSEXUALS 
FOR EQUAL PROTECTION PURPOSES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clear-
ance Office/ a class action suit,2 the Ninth Circuit held that 
homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class3 
under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's 
due process clause.' Therefore, the court determined that the 
1. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 
1990) (per Brunetti, J.; the other panel members were Leavy, J., and Curtis, J., senior 
U.S. District Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation), reh'g en banc 
denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990). 
2. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565. The plaintiff class consisted of: "All gay per· 
sons who, since January 1982, have applied for, are now applying for, or may in the 
future apply for Secret or Top Secret industrial clearances from DISCO, in any of the 
eight DIS regions in the country, and all gay persons who, since January, 1982, have 
held, now hold, or may in the future hold such clearances." [d. at n.l. 
3. [d. at 574. See infra notes 56·99 and accompanying text for discussion on the 
three· tiered standard of review. 
The scope of this holding extends to homosexual conduct. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 
at 573. The Ninth Circuit did not discuss whether the holding only applied to gay men 
so as to exclude lesbian or bisexual employees of defense contractors. However, the court 
stated that the term "homosexual" encompassed both the terms "gay" and "lesbian." [d. 
at 565 n.2. In general, the courts do not differ significantly in their treatment of gay men, 
lesbian women, or bisexuals. See, e.g., Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the 
Wake of Bowers u. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773 n.2 (1988). 
Throughout this Note, the term "gay" and "homosexual" will refer to both lesbian 
women, gay men and bisexuals unless otherwise noted. 
4. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. See infra notes 48·51 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the fifth amendment right of equal protection. 
81 
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homosexual class was only entitled to rational basis review:~ The 
court found that actions of the Defense Industrial Security 
Clearance Office (DISCO)6 did not violate first amendment guar-
antees of freedom of speech and association.7 
II. FACTS 
Plaintiffs brought a class action6 against the Department of 
Defense (DoD) for conducting expanded investigations into the 
backgrounds of all gay applicants for Secret and Top Secret 
Clearances.9 The three named plaintiffs, Joel Crawford, Timothy 
Dooling and Robert Weston,10 challenged the constitutionality of 
5. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. The court found that the Department of De-
fense's (000) regulations were rationally based and, in this instance, did not violate 
plaintiffs' fifth amendment right to equal protection. Id. at 576. 
6. Throughout this Note, the following acronyms will be used: 
DIS Defense Investigative Service 
DISCO Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office 
DISCR Directorate for Industrial Security Clearance Review 
000 Department of Defense 
7. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 580. DISCO recommended denial of Secret security 
clearance for the plaintiff Dooling because of sexual perversion; several "homosexual at-
tributes" were cited including membership in a gay organization. Id. at 580. DISCO au-
tomatically referred all homosexual applicants to the Directorate for Industrial Security 
Clearance Review (hereinafter DISCR) for an expanded investigation. [d. at 568. See 
infra notes 23-41 for a discussion of the security clearance process. The court noted that 
the plaintiffs had "not shown that membership in a gay organization to be a distinct, 
separate, abstract ground for denying security clearances." High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 
580. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs' right to petition the courts for redress of 
grievances was not violated. See id. at 580-81 (dismissing Crawford's first amendment 
claim). 
8. See supra note 2 for definition of the plaintiff class. 
9. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565~ 
10. Id. at 569. In December of 1981, SRI International, a defense contractor, for-
warded the application of Joel Crawford, a gay employee, to DISCO for a Secret indus-
trial clearance. Id.; see also Brief for Appellants at 9, High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. 
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 87-2987). DISCO initially recom-
mended ineligibility based on his promiscuity and his current treatment for an ongoing 
schizophreniform disorder. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 580. DISCO forwarded the ap-
plication to DISCR. Id. The district court found that DISCR denied the clearance be-
cause of "homosexual activity and susceptibility to coercion." High Tech Gays v. Defense 
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (per Henderson, 
J.), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). After receiving correspondence from Crawford's 
attorney, DISCR withdrew its decision for further consideration. Id. DISCR then 
changed the basis of ineligibility to Crawford's prior use of marijuana. High Tech Gays, 
895 F.2d at 580. 
In May of 1983, Lockheed, a defense contractor, forwarded Timothy Dooling's appli-
cation for a Secret industrial clearance to DISCO. Id.; see also Brief for Appellants at 9. 
In March of 1984, DISCO referred the application to DISCR for an expanded investiga-
10
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the policies and practices of DISCO and the Directorate for In-
dustrial Security Clearance Review (DISCR).l1 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the expanded investigations and additional proce-
dural hurdlesl2 to which heterosexual applicants were not 
subjected violated equal protection13 and denied gay applicants 
the rights of free association guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. l " The defendants maintained that their regulations were 
tion because of Dooling's admissions relating to Dooling's homosexuality and recom-
mended that he be considered ineligible. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 579. His admis-
sions included "disclosures regarding his visits to gay bathhouses, his membership in 
[High Tech Gays) a homosexual organization, his homosexual activities with casual ac-
quaintances, his intention to inform his employer as to his homosexuality, and his inten-
tion to continue his homosexual lifestyle in the future .... " Id. Despite DISCO's recom-
mendation, DISCR granted Dooling a Secret clearance. High Tech Gays v. Defense 
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1366. 
Robert Weston, a gay employee at Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., had been granted 
a Secret Clearance. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 569. At the time, DoD guidelines in-
structed companies not to submit Top Secret applications absent compelling need if the 
application contained information which would cause lengthy delays. Weston v. Lock-
heed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1989) (appeal dismissed solely 
because plaintiff failed to address the government's successful assertion of the state 
secrets privilege in the lower court). Lockheed believed that these regulations required 
non-submittal of applications revealing evidence of homosexuality. Id. Weston's applica-
tion was not forwarded as it disclosed his membership in a gay organization. High Tech 
Gays, 895 F.2d at 569 n.5. 
11. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1366. 
See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the security clearance 
process. 
The plaintiffs asked the district court to: 1) declare unconstitutional and enjoin the 
DISCO policy of refusing to grant clearances to gays who have participated in homosex-
ual activities in the last 15 years and automatically requiring that applications of gays be 
forwarded to DISCR for further proceedings; 2) declare unconstitutional and enjoin the 
DIS practice of subjecting gay applicants to extensive additional investigations; 3) de-
clare unconstitutional DISCO's use of 'five reasons' to recommend denial of plaintiff-
Dooling's clearance; 4) declare unconstitutional DISCR's processing of plaintiff-Craw-
ford's application subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit; and 5) purge the Defense Cen-
tral Index of Investigations of derogatory information about all class members. High 
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367. 
Plaintiffs also sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from continuing to 
enforce such policies. I d. 
12. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 
1364, 1366. The plaintiffs did not specifically allege that the defendants, as a policy, 
denied security clearances to all gay applicants. Id. at 1366. The government had granted 
a Secret clearance to Dooling, one of the class representatives. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 
at 569. 
13. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367. 
See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the fifth amendment's 
applicability to these issues. 
14. High Tech Gays v. Defense ·Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1367, 
1377-78. 
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rationally based. IIi 
15. Id. at 1373. The defendants presented the following evidence supporting their 
policy with respect to gays: 
1) Plaintiffs Crawford and Dooling allegedly had emotional problems adjusting to 
their sexual orientation. Id. at 1374. 
2) A newspaper account quoted a person convicted for stealing secret documents 
who at his sentencing hearing said that he stole "to prove ... I could be a man and still 
be gay." Id. 
3) John Donnelly, an Assistant Deputy for Under Secretary of Defense for Counter-
intelligence and Security, concluded that hostile intelligence agencies often attempt to 
exploit human weaknesses including sexual vulnerability. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 
576 (discussing John Donnelly's Declaration in Support of DoD's Motion for New Trial 
(Reconsideration) at 3). He noted that such agencies evaluate each individual with the 
desired access and assess the best approach to compromise them. Id. 
4) Major Francis R. Short, USMC, Judge Advocate in the United States Marine 
Corps, stated that at the trial of Sergeant Lonetree, the court accepted the testimony of 
Mr. John Barron as an expert. Id. at 576 (discussing Major Francis R. Short's Declara-
tion in Support of DoD's Motion for a New Trial). Major Short declared that Mr. Barron 
testified: "[TJhe KGB will attempt to identify those who are . .. experiencing problems 
with . .. homosexuality . ... " Id. at 577 (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit) (discuss-
ing Major Short's Declaration at 1-2). Barron testified that the KGB entrapped a Cana-
dian ambassador to the Soviet Union through the exploitation of a homosexual relation-
ship.ld. 
5) Barron stated that the KGB believes "homosexuality often is accompanied by 
personality disorders that make the victim potentially unstable and vulnerable to adroit 
manipulation." Id. (discussing BARRON, KGB THE SECRET WORK OF SOVIET SECRET 
AGENTS 280 (1974)). The KGB believes that as gays are aware they are different and this 
makes them want to seek revenge against society. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. 
Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp at 1374. 
6) Sergeant Lonetree made sworn statements to special agents of the Naval Investi-
gative Service relating a meeting with a KGB officer. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 577. 
Extracts of the statements revealed that the KGB officer specifically asked Lonetree "to 
tell him who were the homosexuals . .. and people who were exploitable who worked in 
the embassy as civilians." Id. (emphasis added by the Ninth Circuit) (discussing State-
ment of Sgt. Lonetree, Dec. 29, 1986). 
The plaintiffs, however, presented the following evidence that it was irrational to 
treat gays differently from heterosexuals: 
1) The American Psychiatric Association in a position statement found that homo-
sexuality per se is one form of sexual behavior and, like other forms which are not by 
themselves psychiatric disorders, is not considered a mental disorder. High Tech Gays v. 
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1374 (discussing AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
Assoc., POSITION STATEMENT ON HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS (Dec. 15, 1973)). The 
Association also declared that "[hlomosexuality per se implies no impairment in judg-
ment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities." Resolution of the 
American Psychological Association, January 1975. 
2) The United States Public Health Service no longer considers homosexuality to be 
a mental disorder and refuses to issue medical certificates solely on the basis of homosex-
uality. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1374-75 
(discussing Hill v. United States INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983) (the 
Health Service has recognized that "current and generally accepted canons of medical 
practice" do not consider homosexuality per se to be a psychiatric disorder)). 
3) At Senate subcommittee hearings,the F.B.I. and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
produced no evidence of persons being blackmailed because of homosexuality. Id. at 
12
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The district court found that classifications16 such as the 
DoD security clearance regulations which disadvantage gays 
must either withstand heightened scrutiny, as gay people are a 
quasi-suspect class,17 or must withstand strict scrutiny as they 
violate the right of gays to engage in any homosexual activity, 
not merely sodomy, and thus impinge upon their exercise of a 
fundamental right. IS Further, even if neither strict nor height-
ened scrutiny were applied, there was no rational basis for sub-
jecting all gay applicants to expanded investigations.19 The dis-
1375 (discussing Federal Government Security Clearance Programs: Hearings Before 
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs 
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 171-87,913-26 (1985». Of approximately 40 
significant espionage cases, only two involved homosexuals and none involved blackmail. 
Id. 
4) A factual study allegedly demonstrated that of 19 gay applicants for security 
clearances who were subjected to expanded investigations, only two were denied security 
clearances. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575 (discussing Plaintiffs' Brief Supporting Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 6-7). 
5) In a deposition, Richard Olinger, a former manager of the Government Security 
Department at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, told of two conferences he at-
tended while at Lockheed regarding security concerns. Id. at 575-76 (discussing Plain-
tiffs' Brief Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 9). He stated' that the question 
of whether homosexuality posed a security risk was not discussed at these conferences. 
Id. 
16. See infra notes 52-99 and accompanying text for discussion of various classifica-
tions under equal protection review. 
17. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1368. 
The district court reasoned that factors warranting heightened scrutiny for gender classi-
fications are also present in classifications based on sexual orientation. Id. at 1369. The 
sex characteristic bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society and 
reflect an outmoded notion of the relative capabilities of the sexes. Id. 
The court also observed that pervasive discrimination against gays has seriously im-
paired their ability to gain a politically viable voice for their view in state and local 
legislatures and in Congress. Id. at 1370. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text 
for discussion of heightened scrutiny and quasi-suspect classes. 
18. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1370. 
The district court found that DoD regulations required expanded investigation for any 
homosexual activity. Id. The court observed that states are only allowed to criminalize 
homosexual sodomy. Id. at 1370-71 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
which did not address whether gays may engage in other activities such as kissing, hold-
ing hands, and caressing). See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for discussion 
of Hardwick. 
The district court held that the right to privacy extends to all persons and mandates 
a fundamental right to engage in affectional and sexual activity that has not been tradi-
tionally proscribed as sodomy. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 
668 F. Supp. at 1372. For example, the district court found that the Constitution pro-
tects the freedom to express physically basic human emotions and feelings, the right to 
express affection, attraction, and love for another human being through sexual activity 
not proscribed by Hardwick. Id. 
19. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1373. 
13
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trict court held that the DoD violated the plaintiffs' equal 
protection rights20 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment;21 DISCO appealed.22 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS 
If a defense contractor employee needs a Secret or Top Se-
cret clearance to perform his job, the contractor submits an ap-
plication to the DoD.23 The DoD forwards a Secret clearance ap-
plication to DISCO,24 who conducts a record check with the FBI 
and the Defense Central Intelligence Index. 2~ The investigation 
may also include records checks with the CIA, the State Depart-
ment, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Immigration 
20. [d. at 1373. The plaintiffs pleaded their case on the assumption that either the 
first or fifth amendment contains an equal protection clause. [d. at 1367. 
21. [d. at 1377. The district court enjoined the DoD from enforcing its regulations 
with respect to other members of the class for which plaintiffs were representatives. [d. 
at 1379. Summary judgment shall be granted if evidence shows that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
22. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th 
Cir. 1990). DISCO filed motions for stay pending appeal and for reconsideration based 
on new evidence that foreign intelligence services target gays. [d. at 568-70. The district 
court granted the motion for stay, but denied the motion for reconsideration. [d. at 569-
70. 
DISCO appealed the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and 
sought reversal of the district court's grant of the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment based on the following issues: 
1) the district court's determination that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class for 
purposes of equal protection review; 
2) the application of the "heightened scrutiny" standard to the review of DoD 
regulations; 
3) the court's determination that plaintiff's evidence and affidavits made a sufficient 
showing that the DoD does not have a rational basis for its expanded security investiga-
tion of homosexuals; 
4) the determination that the DoD did not meet its burden of persuasion by demon-
strating that its policies and procedures for homosexuals are rationally related to permis-
sible ends; and 
5) the court's finding that DISCO's use of mere membership in a 'gay organization' 
as grounds to refuse a clearance and automatically requiring additional investigation vio-
lated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights. [d. at 570-79 (quoting High Tech Gays v. 
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. at 1378). 
23. 32 C.F.R. §§ 154.30-.31 (1989). 
24. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565-66. 
25. [d. at 566 (discussing 32 C.F.R. § 154.3(m); DoD 5200.2-R, app. B (1979». 
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and Naturalization Service. 26 For a Top Secret clearance appli-
cation, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) conducts a 
"Background Investigation. "27 
DISCO uses guidelines set forth as part of the DoD Person-
nel Security Program28 in determining whether there is adverse 
information29 that will prevent the granting of clearance.3o If ad-
verse information is uncovered, DISCO will conduct an ex-
panded investigation to substantiate or disprove the informa-
tion. 31 In addition, a personal interview of the applicant is 
conducted.32 Thereafter, DISCO will grant the Secret clearance 
unless that would be inconsistent with the national interest, in 
which case the application is forwarded to DISCR.33 A similar 
procedure is followed for Top Secret Clearances. 3ol 
DISCR evaluates referrals using criteria set forth in DoD di-
rectives35 and determines whether or not to grant a clearance.36 
The DIS Manual for Personnel Security Investigations estab-
26. [d. A record check similar to that done with the FBI is done with these agencies. 
[d. 
27. [d. A Background Investigation includes a "local records check" and interviews 
with personal sources. [d. 
28. 32 CFR pt. 154, app. 0 (1989) 
29. [d. Background Investigations must be considered devoid of significant adverse 
information unless they contain, for example, information characterized as "[m]ental, 
nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders .... " [d. at 504 § 4. 
Adverse information "impunge[s] the subject's moral character, threaten[s] the subject's 
future federal employment, raisers] the question of subject's security clearability; or [is] 
otherwise stigmatizing." High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566 (discussing 32 C.FR § 
154.8(i)(2) (1989». 
30. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566 (discussing DoD 5200.2-R, app. E (1979». 
31. 32 C.FR § 154.8(j) (1989). The adverse information must be relevant to a secur-
ity determination. [d. 
32. [d. at § 154.8(i)(2). 
33. [d. at §§ 155.2(c), 155.7(a). 
34. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 566, 568; see 32 C.FR §§ 155.2(c), 155.7(a) (1989). 
35. 32 C.FR § 154.6(b) (1989). For example, in determining whether a person is 
eligible for clearances, "all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and 
trustworthiness [must be] such that entrusting the person with classified information ... 
is clearly consistent with the interests of national security." [d. 
The decision must be an overall common sense determination based on all available 
facts. [d. at § 154.7. The criteria for determining ineligibility for a clearance includes 
"[a]cts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, 
or lack of regard for the laws of society." [d. at § 154.7(q). Disqualifying factors under 
sexual misconduct are listed and include acts performed in public places, recent adul-
tery, child molesting, and sodomy. [d. at pt. 154, app. H. 
36. [d. at § 155.7(b). 
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lishes operational, investigative, and procedural policy.37 Allega-
tions of heterosexual conduct between consenting adults are nor-
mally ignored.38 However, other deviant sexual conduct,39 which 
may cast doubt on the individual's morality, emotional or 
mental stability and may raise questions as to susceptibility to 
coercion is investigated.40 DISCO unconditionally refers all gay 
applicants to the DISCR for expanded investigations for both 
types of clearances.41 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment42 
guarantees that all persons similarly situated are to be treated 
alike.43 The equal protection clause mandates that the states re-
frain from enacting any statute or regulation which invidiously 
discriminates against a group of persons." A statute or regula-
tion also cannot discriminate against people based on character-
istics irrelevant to a constitutional purpose.41i 
37. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 568 (discussing Defense Investigative Service Man-
ual DIS 20-1-M (1985». 
38. [d. (discussing DIS 20-1-M ~ 4-10, at 4-5 (1985». However, extramarital sexual 
relations are considered legitimate grounds for inquiry when the potential for undue in-
fiuence exists. [d. 
39. [d. Deviant sexual conduct includes exhibitionism, sadism, and voyeurism. [d. 
40. [d. (discussing DIS 20-1-M, ~ 4-11, at 4-5, 4-6 (1985». 
41. [d. at 568. 
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that: 
"[n)o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
[d. 
43. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1954) (zoning 
ordinance, as applied, resulted in the denial of a special use permit for construction of a 
group home for the mentally retarded) (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982». 
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490-91 n.5 (1954) (segregation 
in public schools in various states alleged to deprive black children of their equal protec-
tion rights under the fourteenth amendment). [d. In Brown, the Court observed that the 
fourteenth amendment contains a positive immunity: the right of blacks to exemption 
from "unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored . .. implying inferi-
ority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others 
enjoy, and [from) discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condi-
tion of a subject race." [d. (emphasis added). 
45. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964) (state statute pro-
hibited unmarried interracial couples from habitually occupying the same room at night; 
punishment of promiscuity with one racial group and not with another was not related to 
state's interest in preventing breaches of basic concepts of sexual decency). See Note, 
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classifi-
cation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1299 (1985) [hereinafter Homosexuality as a Suspect 
16
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The fourteenth amendment applies to the states but not to 
the federal government.48 In Bolling v. Sharpe,47 the United 
States Supreme Court observed that the fifth amendment's due 
process clause48 contains an equal protection requirement.4e 
Therefore, fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees 
apply to the federal government through the fifth amendment. llo 
The analytic approach to a fifth amendment equal protec-
tion claim mirrors the approach used to review a fourteenth 
amendment claim. III A court begins its review by determining 
Classification] . 
46. See United States v. Sperry Corp, 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989) (equal protection 
claim against the United States brought under the fifth amendment due process clause); 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (segregation of public schools in the District 
of Columbia alleged to deprive black children of their due process rights under the fifth 
amendment). 
47. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides, in part "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law .... " [d. The fifth amendment does not contain an equal protection 
clause. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (statute mandated loss of citizenship 
to a naturalized citizen if the citizen resided continuously for three years in the territory 
of the foreign state of which he was formerly a national); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
49. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499·500 (equal protection and due process are not mu-
tually exclusive concepts). In Bolling, the Court observed that the fifth and not the four-
teenth amendment applies to the District of Columbia. [d. at 498-99. However, the Court 
found that while not interchangeable, "concepts of equal protection and due process, 
both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." [d. The 
Court found that governmental discrimination which violates equal protection guaran-
tees may be so unjustifiable as to also violate due process. [d. (discussing Brown v. Board 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954». The Court held that segregation of public schools in the 
District of Columbia deprived black schoolchildren of their fifth amendment right to due 
process as such discrimination had deprived them of equal protection. [d. at 499-500. 
See also Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. 387, 396 (1989) (user fees, authorized by § 502 of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, charged against awards received by claimants from 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, did not violate the due process clause equal 
protection component); INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988) (statute authorized 
the Commissioner of Immigration and·Naturalization to designate representatives to re-
ceive petitions, conduct hearings, and grant naturalization outside the United States; the 
naturalization officer's authority was revoked for a nine-month period between 1945 and 
1946; Filipino nationals who had served the United States Armed Forces during World 
War II sought citizenship pursuant to the statute); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636,638 n.2, 643-53 (1975) (Act of Congress granted survivors' benefits based on earnings 
of a deceased husband and father both to the widow and to the couple's minor children 
in her care but granted benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife and mother 
only to the minor children and not to the widower). 
50. See Sperry Corp., 110 S. Ct. at 396; Pangilinan, 486 U.S. at 885; Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. at 638 n.2; Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500. 
51. E.g., Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2 (approach to fifth amendment equal pro-
tection claims precisely the same as fourteenth amendment equal protection claims); see 
17
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the standard of review to apply to the challenged classification: 
strict,1I2 heightened,1I3 or rational. basisll4 scrutiny,lIl1 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
Strict scrutiny is applied to suspect classesll6 and is gener-
ally fatal to· legislative or regulatory classifications,II7 Under 
also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (statute provided 
that spouses of male Air Force officers were dependents for purposes of medical, dental 
and housing benefits but that spouses of female officers were not dependents, unless they 
were in fact dependent for over one half of their support; denial of dependent status and 
resulting benefits to Air Force officer's spouse alleged to deny servicewoman of due pro· 
cess). In Frontiero, a fifth amendment claim was analyzed using fourteenth amendment 
pre'cedent. See id. 
52. See infra notes 56-91 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
54. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
55. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1954). 
56. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297-98. The 
courts generally base the determination of who is a suspect class on the model of race. 
Id. See infra notes 59-68 for discussion of classes afforded suspect class status. In prac-
tice, courts may consider the possible state interests which would support the classifica-
tion as part of determining who is afforded suspect class status. Homosexuality as a 
Suspect Classification, at 1298. 
Apart from the race model, suspect status has been asserted to protect "discrete and 
insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938) 
(Congress prohibited the interstate shipment of "filled" milk; legislation upheld over 
claimed due process violation). 
57. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972). Groups qualifying for strict scrutiny are said to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. San Antonio School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text 
for discussion of Rodriguez. 
Whether the standard of review applied has any effect on the outcome of any case 
has been questioned. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (Oklahoma statutes prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 
and females under the age of 18). In Craig, Justice Stevens observed that: 
[W)hat has become known as the [tiered) analysis of equal 
protection claims does not describe a completely logical 
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court 
has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single 
standard in a reasonably consistent fashion .... I have always 
asked myself whether I could find a "rational basis" for the 
classification at issue. The term "rational" ... includes a re-
quirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe 
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose 
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvan-
taged class. Thus, the word "rational" ... includes elements of 
legitimacy and neutrality .... 
18
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strict scrutiny, legislation is constitutional only if it IS suitably 
tailored to serve a compellingll8 state interest. liS 
The classification that most clearly qualifies for suspect 
class treatment under the fourteenth amendment are those 
based on race.60 In Palmore v. Sidoti,6} the Court observed that 
Id. (emphasis added). 
58. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court has attached no particular signifi-
cance to the varied characterizations of a "compelling" state interest. In re Griffiths, 413 
U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (statute prohibited aliens from practicing law; permissible and sub-
stantial interest required). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (statute re-
quired residence in the state for one year and in the county for three months as a prereq-
uisite for registration to vote; important interest required); Graham v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (several states had made eligibility for welfare benefits conditioned 
upon citizenship or, in the case of aliens, upon having resided in the country for a speci-
fied number of years; compelling interest required); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 
(1967) (statue prohibited miscegenation; overriding interest required); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (overriding statutory purpose). 
59. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192). 
As strict scrutiny is generally fatal to legislative classifications, this aspect of the analysis 
(considering the state's interests) is often slighted. See Homosexuality as a Suspect 
Classification, supra note 45, at 1298. The consideration of what state interests are per-
missible has become more important with the advent of intermediate levels of scrutiny 
as such consideration addresses the issue of what majoritarian goals are permissible 
under the equal protection clause. Id. In short, how is a court to know -"whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities [is) a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily ... relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry[?)" Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 nA. 
This controversial issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, as the Constitu-
tion itself protects religious, national and racial minorities, former Judge Bork has sug-
gested that the minorities Justice Stone referred to in Carolene Products are those who 
cannot win their battles in the political process because of prejudice. R. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 58-61 (1990). Judge Bork criticized Stone's "more searching judi-
cial inquiry" as allowing Justices to inject into the Constitution their own subjective 
values and policy preferences - to, in effect, overrule democratic majorities. Id. at 61. 
60. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (core purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to 
end all governmentally imposed race discrimination); Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (central pur-
pose is to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination); McLaugh-
lin, 379 U.S. at 192 (central purpose is to eliminate racial discrimination by the states 
and thereby renders racial classifications constitutionally suspect); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497,499 (1954) (classifications based on race are constitutionally suspect); Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954) (while prohibitory, also has a positive im-
munity: the right for blacks to be exempt from legislation aimed directly at them as 
blacks and the right to be exempt from legal discrimination implying inferiority in civil 
society); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (Executive Order ex-
cluded citizens of Japanese origin from a West Coast military area and required them to 
remain in their residences from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m.; restrictions curtailing the civil rights of 
a single racial group are suspect); see also, Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 
supra note 45, at 1298. 
61. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
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racial classifications deserve the most exacting scrutiny as classi-
fying persons according to race likely reflects prejudice rather 
than legitimate public concerns.62 Classifications based on "na-
tional origin" are extended strict scrutiny as national origin is 
similar to race.6S Suspect class status has also been extended to 
alienage classifications.64 
62. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 (preventing possible injury and social stigmatization of 
child). Further, private biases are impermissible considerations in determining a child's 
custody. [d. at 433. 
63. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Illinois statute allowed illegitimate children to inherit 
by intestate succession only from their mothers while legitimate children could inherit 
by intestate succession from both parents). Justice Rehnquist observed that the Framers 
obviously meant the equal protection clause to apply to national origin, the "first cousin" 
of race. [d.; Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 425-27 (1948) (Murphy, 
J., concurring) (California statute barred issuing commercial fishing licenses to persons 
"ineligible to citizenship"; the purpose of such legislation, directed against aliens of Jap-
anese birth, was to give effect to racial animosity); Jamil v. Secretary, Dept. of Defense, 
910 F.2d 1203, 1205 (4th Cir. 1990) (DoD employee discharged for failure. to obtain a 
Top Secret security clearance; plaintiff had Asian-American parents living abroad and 
had defaulted on a student loan). In Jamil, the court observed that if the plaintiff had 
been dismissed because of his national origin, he would have had a valid equal protection 
claim. [d. at 1209. 
Classifications based on race and national origin are usually invalidated as the state 
interests are not compelling. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33 (state court's divestment of 
child from natural mother because she married a black man held unconstitutional; state 
interest in preventing injury from private biases). In Palmore, the Court observed that 
racial classifications are invalidated if they show invidious discrimination even if the 
seeming purpose of the classification is to protect against acknowledged discrimination. 
[d. at 433-34. See also Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (state interest in preserving racial pride, 
integrity and preventing the corruption of blood was not a legitimate, independent, over-
riding basis for anti-miscegenation laws; such classifications amount to invidious discrim-
ination and were characterized as designed to maintain white supremacy); Bolling, 347 
U.S. at 499-500 (racial segregation is unjustifiable discrimination); Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. at 493 (schools segregated pursuant to state laws; interest in providing 
equal educational opportunities); but contra McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 193 (interest in 
preventing illicit extra- and pre-marital promiscuity and other basic notions of sexual 
decency); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-19 (the government's interest in protecting against 
espionage and sabotage deemed compelling). 
These types of classifications are also invalidated where they are not suitably tai-
lored to serve legitimate interests. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192-93 (Florida statute 
punishing unmarried interracial couples and not couples of the same race who cohabitate 
in the same room at night amounts to invidious discrimination; law did not have general 
application); Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500 (segregation in public education is not reasonably 
related to a proper governmental objective); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
at 493 (segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race is not reasona-
bly related to providing black children with equal educational opportunities). But see 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (classification was related to government interest as the gov-
ernment had grounds to believe that persons constituting threat to national security 
could not be isolated and separately dealt with). 
64. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.5 
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Until the mid-1970s, the Court lacked coherent principles to 
determine what standard of review applied to non-racial classifi-
cations.6~ In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,66 the 
(state barred aliens from becoming notary publics; strict scrutiny applied as the actual 
function of a notary public is ministerial and not policymaking); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717,720-21 (1973) (state court rule prohibited resident aliens from taking the bar exami-
nation solely because of lack of citizenship; classifications based on alienage are inher-
ently suspect); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (state law provided that 
only U.S. citizens could hold permanent positions in the competitive class of the state 
civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (states denied welfare ben-
efits to resident aliens or to aliens who had not resided in the United States for a certain 
number of years; aliens are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority). 
But contra Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80 (1979) (statute prohibited perma-
nent certification of non-U.S. citizens from teaching positions unless the applicant mani-
fested an intent to seek U.S. citizenship; rational basis standard applied as teaching is a 
governmental function); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (statute prohibited 
employing aliens as state troopers; rational basis scrutiny applied as the police execute 
government policies and the right to govern may be reserved to a state's citizens). In 
Foley, the Court observed that some limitations on aliens do not require strict scrutiny 
review. Id. at 294 (citing Dougall, 413 U.S. at 648 (the Court observed that not alllimita-
tions on aliens are unconstitutional». 
Alienage classifications are invalidated if the state lacks a compelling interest. 
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 227 (interest that notaries be reasonably familiar with state law or 
ensuring the later availability of notaries' testimony); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722-23 
(assuring general fitness requisite of persons licensed to practice law); Dougall, 413 U.S. 
at 641 (having the undivided loyalty of employees without the potential impairment of 
judgment attendant with foreign citizenship); Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372 (state's inter-
est in reserving limited welfare benefits for own citizens inadequate to justify denial of 
the necessities of life (welfare benefits) to aliens). But contra Norwick, 441 U.S. at 77 
(inculcating children with the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system); Foley, 435 U.S. at 296 (legitimate to have citizens employed 
as police officers as they execute broad public policy). 
Alienage classifications are also invalidated where they are not necessarily related to 
accomplishing its purpose. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722 (the statute must be nec-
essary to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest). See also 
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219, 227 (interest must be furthered by the least restrictive means 
available); Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643 (the means the state employs must be precisely 
drawn in light of the acknowledged purpose). 
But contra Norwick, 441 U.S. at 80 (rational relationship required; citizenship re-
quirement applicable to teaching in the public schools was carefully framed to serve its 
purpose as it bars from teaching only those aliens who have demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to obtain citizenship). Foley, 435 U.S. at 296 (state must only show a rational 
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification). 
In Foley, the government's interest (the right of the public to ensure government by its 
own peers), justified the classification. Id. at 296-97. The reservation of policy-making 
positions to its citizens was within the State's constitutional prerogatives. Id. 
65. Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297; see City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that the 
Court had not delineated any well defined standards in the area of equal protection and 
that the Court's precedent reflected only judgmental responses to differing classifica-
tions. Id. at 451. 
66. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Mexican-American parents instituted a class action suit on 
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Court developed general criteria describing which groups war-
rant the strict scrutiny standard.67 The group must be saddled 
with disabilities,68 subjected to a history of discrimination,611 and 
behalf of school children of minority groups or poor families who resided in school dis-
tricts having a low property tax base). In Rodriguez, the state supplied roughly half of all 
public school funds. Id. at 9. The school districts supplemented their revenues from ad 
valorem taxes on property within each jurisdiction. [d. at 10-11. The plaintiff-class 
claimed this reliance on local property taxes favored the more affluent districts in viola-
tion of equal protection. See id. at 16. The Court found that substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures did in fact exist. Id. at 15. However, the Court found 
that the Texas system did not operate to the disadvantage of any identifiable suspect 
class. Id. at 28-29. Wealth discrimination, where poor persons receive less expensive edu-
cations than more affluent persons, is not a suspect classification as the defined classes of 
poor schoolchildren were not absolutely deprived of an education. [d. at 25. Sec also, 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987) (amendments to the AFDC program re-
quiring that a family's eligibility for benefits must take into account the income of all 
parents, brothers and sisters living in the same home; close relatives are not a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class) (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313-15 (1976) (per curiam) (classification called for the mandatory retirement of uni-
formed state police officers at age 50 upheld as it rationally protects the public by assur-
ing physical preparedness of police)). 
67. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. However, the general characteristics of a group may 
play much less a role than the legitimacy of the perceived state interest in determining 
whether the group is a suspect class. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 
supra note 45, at 1298. 
68. Id. at 28. In determining class status for equal protection analysis, the disability 
that a class suffers from is important if it is one that society has imposed because of 
stereotyped characteristics: an irrational conclusion about the abilities of a class made 
after considering an irrelevant class trait or characteristic. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 
at 441-42; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
When individuals in a group affected by a statute have distinguishing characteristics 
relevant to the interests of a state, the state has the authority to implement the statute if 
the statute bears a rational relationship to the legitimate interest. City of Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 441. In City of Cleburne, the Court found that mentally retarded persons have a 
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world. [d. at 442. Conse-
quently, mental retardation is a classification that only requires rational basis review. Id. 
at 442. 
But with respect to gender classifications, the Court noted that "the sex characteris-
tic" usually bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. [d. at 440-41. 
Similarly, the Court has observed that illegitimacy is beyond an individual's control and 
bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. Id. 
at 441 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (provision in Social Security 
Act denied presumptions of dependency to illegitimate but not legitimate children for 
determining survivor's benefits)). In Mathews, the Court observed that illegitimate chil-
dren have suffered disabilities in the past; however, discrimination against illegitimates 
had never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political 
discrimination against women and blacks. Id. at 506 (rejecting a strict scrutiny stan-
dard); but contra Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (statute prohibited a mother 
from initiating a paternity suit to identify the father of an illegitimate child for child 
support if the child is more than two years old; heightened scrutiny applied). See also 
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (although the aged suffer from discrimination they are not sub-
jected to unique disabilities that are based on stereotypes). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss1/9
1991] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95 
have been banished to a position of political powerlessness.70 
The immutability of the group's identifying trait should also be 
considered.71 
Strict scrutiny review is also applied to statutory classifica-
tions which burden a fundamental right. 72 Fundamental rights 
are interests implicit in the concept of ordered liberty73 or are 
deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition.74 In Rodri-
69. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (a history of purposeful, unequal treatment). The 
Court found in Rodriguez, under wealth classifications, precise equal advantages are not 
required. [d. at 24. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (close relatives have not 
been subjected to discrimination); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (the aged have not exper-
ienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment). 
70. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443 (mentally re-
tarded individuals are not politically powerless as their needs have been addressed by 
lawmakers); Castillo, 477 U.S. at 638 (close relatives are not politically powerless). 
See also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discuss-
ing the "presumption of constitutionality" when legislation appears facially to be within 
a specific prohibition of the Constitution). Justice Stone introduced the idea that 
prejudice against 'discrete and insular' minorities may be a special condition which cur-
tails the operation of political processes or outcomes in favor of those minorities. I d. at 
153 n.4. Justice Stone implied such a condition might warrant a "more searching judicial 
inquiry." [d. 
71. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Identifying traits are 
generally considered physical characteristics which are obvious or distinguishing. See id. 
In Frontiero, Justice Brennan found that sex, as an accident of birth, is an immutable 
characteristic like race and national origin. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
Race, of course, is considered an immutable characteristic. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (provision of the Public Works Employ-
ment Act required that absent administrative waiver, the state or local grantee of federal 
funds for public works projects must use at least 10% of the funds to procure services or 
supplies from businesses owned by minorities). C{. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 
(retarded persons are immutably different in relevant respects). In City of Cleburne, the 
Court also observed that the aging, disabled, mentally ill, and the infirm also have immu-
table characteristics. [d. at 444-46. Contra Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602 (parents, children, and 
siblings do not have characteristics that define them as a group); Castillo, 477 U.S. at 
638 (federal food stamp program determined benefit levels by treating parents, children, 
and siblings who live together as a single household, but excluded more distant relatives 
and groups of unrelated persons from the household; close relatives do not exhibit obvi-
ous, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics). 
72. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602-03 (citing Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638). 
73. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (state appealed a convic-
tion for second degree murder with a sentence for life imprisonment under a statute 
allowing appeal in criminal cases; upon reversal and retrial, the accused was convicted of 
first degree murder and sentenced to death - fourteenth amendment due process 
claim). In Palko, the Court found that the right must be such "that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed." Id. at 326. 
74. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (housing ordinance lim-
ited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a "single family," defined as to exclude 
a mother living with her son and two grandsons - fourteenth amendment due process 
claim). 
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guez,7r' the Court noted that fundamental rights are either ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.76 The 
Court has found that voting,77 interstate travel,78 access to the 
75. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
76. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35. In Rodriguez, the Court recognized that 
education is an important state function. [d. at 29-30. The importance of a service per-
formed by a state does not determine whether it is a fundamental right. [d. at 30. See 
also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (statute imposed procedural limitations on 
tenants in suits brought by landlords). In Lindsey, the Court observed that the social 
importance of a statute is not the critical determinant of whether to subject a statute to 
strict scrutiny. See id. at 74. Ct. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to 
individual privacy guaranteed); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (statute 
conditioning the right to vote on a one year residency requirement; right to participate in 
elections on an equal basis with other citizens protected); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942) (right of procreation within the right of personal privacy protected by the 
Constitution). 
77. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Virginia statute making 
the right to vote contingent on payment of a poll tax). In Harper, the Court found that 
the conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a poll tax should be closely 
scrutinized. [d. at 670. Classifications which might restrain or invade fundamental rights 
or liberties must be carefully confined. [d. The right to vote is fundamental to the pres-
ervation of all other rights. [d. at 667 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 
(1964) (existing and proposed plans for Alabama legislative apportionment challenged as 
violating equal protection guarantees)). The Court found that the right of suffrage is a 
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. [d. 
Further, the measuring of a voter's qualifications based on his ability to pay a fee is 
a capricious and irrelevant factor. [d. at 668. Wealth, like race, creed or color, is irrele-
vant to the ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process. [d. at 668-70. Mak-
ing suffrage dependent on the voter's affluence or ability to pay is an invidious discrimi-
natory state standard. ld. at 666. The statute was invalidated as the equal protection 
clause restrains the states from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate. 
ld. Further, once the right to vote is granted, lines may not be drawn which are inconsis-
tent with the equal protection clause. [d. at 665. 
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (New York Education 
statute provided that in certain districts residents permitted to vote only if they are 
parents, have custody or children enrolled, or they owned or leased taxable real property 
within the district). Strict scrutiny was applied as statutes distributing the franchise are 
part of the foundation of representative society. [d. at 626. Any unjustified discrimina-
tion in determining who may participate in political affairs or in selecting public officials 
undermines the legitimacy of representative government. [d. Thus, statutes limiting the 
right to vote must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a legitimate purpose. See id. at 
632. The statute was unconstitutional as it permitted inclusion of persons with remote 
interests in school affairs and excluded others with direct interests. [d. 
78. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statute predicating the receipt of 
welfare assistance on a one year residency requirement challenged on equal protection 
grounds). In Shapiro, the Court observed that the right to interstate travel is a basic 
right under our Constitution. [d. at 630-31 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
757 (1966) (defendants indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to deprive black 
citizens of the exercise of constitutional rights, including the right to engage in interstate 
travel)). This right is implicit under several sections of the Constitution. [d. at 630 n.8: 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871) (state 
statute imposed a discriminatory tax on non-resident traders; right to interstate travel 
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courts79 are fundamental rights. Some forms of privacy are also 
grounded upon the privileges and immunities clause). U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. See also 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (state statute prohibited bringing into 
the state any non·resident knowing him or her to be an indigent; privileges and immuni· 
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment). U.S. CONST. art. V. See also Kent v. Dulles, 
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (Secretary of State denied passports to plaintiffs because of 
their alleged communist beliefs and refusal to file affidavits regarding past or present 
membership in the communist party; due process clause of the fifth amendment). 
The nature of our society and our notions of personal liberty require that all citizens 
be free to travel interstate without unreasonable restrictions. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-
30. As the classification affected a fundamental right, it is reviewed under strict scrutiny. 
See id. at 638. The Court found the statute unconstitutional as the interest in deterring 
indigent migration was not a compelling state interest. [d. at 631. 
See Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Blumstein, the Court observed that a classi-
fication which serves to penalize the right to travel will be invalidated whether or not it 
actually does penalize. [d. at 339-40. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona statute required one year of residency in a county as prerequi-
site for an indigent to receive nonemergency hospitalization or medical care). Whether a 
statute is invalidated turns largely on whether a penalty affects a "necessity of life." See 
id. at 259. The Court found that medical care is such a necessity of life. See id. at 259-61. 
However, states do have a compelling interest in not meddling in matters where 
another state has a paramount interest. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (statute 
requiring one year of residency before bringing a divorce action against a non-resident). 
Further, the state has an interest in divorce consequences which may include provisions 
for custody and support. [d. at 406-07. This residency requirement does not irretrievably 
foreclose a person from seeking a divorce. [d. The Court concluded those who seek a 
divorce may reasonably be required to have some sort of attachment to the state. [d. at 
407. 
79. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (California required an indigent to 
make a preliminary showing of merit before appointing counsel for a direct appeal of 
right; indigent criminal defendants appealed denial of appointed counsel to represent 
them). In Douglas, the Court recognized that the fourteenth amendment's equal protec-
tion clause demands equality of access and protection between the rich and poor. See id. 
at 357-58. This equality requirement cannot be satisfied where a rich man has a mean-
ingful appeal but the indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, is 
only afforded a meaningless ritual. [d. at 358. The Court found that on a first appeal of 
right, the right to counsel is fundamental under the equal protection clause. See id. at 
356-58. If a state grants such an appeal, it must provide counsel to those defendants who 
cannot afford counsel, so they may obtain equal access and properly exercise such rights. 
See id. The Court considered prior decisions where it had invalidated laws discriminat-
ing against indigent criminal defendants. [d. at 355 (discussing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent criminal defendant appealed conviction on fourteenth amend-
ment due process grounds as the state denied him a free trial transcript, which was a 
prerequisite to obtaining appellate review». Thus, when California denied counsel to the 
indigent plaintiff on his only appeal, it invidiously discriminated against him. [d. at 355. 
However, access to the judicial process for discretionary state appeals is not consid-
ered a fundamental right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974) (North Carolina de-
nied appointment of counsel to convicted indigent on discretionary review). In Ross, the 
Court observed that there is no constitutional mandate requiring counsel for discretion-
ary state appeals or for applications to the Supreme Court. [d. at 610,612. The state has 
no obligation to provide an appeal. [d. at 611. Therefore, if the state does not provide 
counsel for discretionary appeals, there is no violation of the Constitution. See id. Un-
fairness results only if indigents are denied meaningful access to the appellate system 
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protected by the Constitution. For example, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,80 the Court held that a state law prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives was unconstitutional as the law violated a funda-
mental right to marital privacy.81 The Court observed that this 
right to marital privacy is fundamental82 as it is within a general 
"zone of privacy" emanating from the first,83 third,84 fourth,8!! 
and fifth amendments.86 The Court has expanded privacy rights 
to include the right of persons to obtain contraceptives without 
undue restriction8? and the right of a woman not to be unduly 
because of their poverty. [d. 
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
81. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
82. See id. 
83. [d. at 482-83 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 511 (1925) (Ore-
gon statute required that parents and others having control of children send them to 
state primary schools; the right to educate one's children as one chooses». 
The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech, or ... the right of the people peaceably to assemble .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. In Griswold, the Court found a specific marital right to privacy. See 
Griswold, 381 U,S. at 485-86. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923) 
(Nebraska statute prohibited the teaching of any language other than english in public 
or private schools; right to study a particular subject or foreign language); DeJonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 363-65 (1937) (Oregon statute prohibited "criminal syndicalism," 
the advocacy of crime or violence as a means of effecting industrial or political change; 
right to assembly); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) (the Alabama attor-
ney general sought memberships lists of all members and agents of the Alabama NAACP 
under a statute that required foreign corporations to file a corporate charter with the 
secretary of state, designate a place of business and an agent for service of process; right 
of freedom of speech and of association). 
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The third amendment provides: "No Soldier shall, in 
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time 
of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
85. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
(Customs Act of 1874 authorized the attorney general to order production of relevant 
papers belonging to persons accused under the Act; the right of people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects». The fourth amendment provides, in part: 
"[t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . . " U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
86. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The fifth amendment provides, in part: "No person 
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. 
87. See Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (statute prohibiting 
the sale or distribution of any contraceptive except by licensed pharmacists to persons 
over sixteen). In Carey, the Court found that the Constitution protects not only use of 
contraceptives but more importantly protects individual decisions regarding childbearing 
from unjustified state intrusion. [d. The right to privacy requires individual autonomy in 
childbearing matters. [d. at 687. Thus, the Court invalidated the statute. [d. at 699. 
See Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (ban on distributing contraceptives 
to unmarried persons for purpose of preventing pregnancy). In Eisenstadt, the Court 
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restricted from having an abortion.88 Finally, the Supreme Court 
has determined that education,89 welfare benefits,90 housing and 
shelter91 are not fundamental rights. 
observed that if the right to privacy is to be meaningful, it must apply to individuals and 
not merely inhere in a marital relationship. [d. at 453. The statute infringed upon an 
individual's choice of whether to beget a child and was thus held unconstitutional. See 
id. at 443, 453. 
Ct. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamsom, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute providing 
for the sterilization of habitual criminals). In Skinner, the Court recognized that equal 
protection requires that those who commit the same quality of offense must be treated 
the same; otherwise, the law invidiously discriminates. [d. at 541. The statute was invali-
dated as some classes of criminals (for example, those committing grand larceny) were 
subject to sterilization, while other classes who engaged in similar offenses (for example, 
embezzlers) were not. [d. 
The Court also examined the relationship between the asserted right of marriage 
and procreation, and the human race. [d. at 541. Laws infringing on the right to procre-
ate require strict scrutiny as marriage and procreation are essential to the survival of the 
human race. [d. Sterilization negates this right and can have devastating effects if in the 
wrong hands. [d. Thus, the Court noted that the right to marriage and procreation is so 
important that remedying the inequality by enlargirig the class of criminals subject to 
sterilization might not solve "this particular constitutional difficulty." [d. at 453. 
88. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164-65 (1973) (state statutes prohibiting the 
right to an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother). In Roe, the 
Court noted that the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. [d. at 
152. However, the Court found a woman's right to decide whether to terminate her preg-
nancy was encompassed within a general right of privacy. See id. at 152-53 (right derived 
from the Bill of Rights; the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments; and the concept of 
liberty in the fourteenth amendment). 
89. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court found that education is not afforded 
explicit nor implicit protection under the Constitution. [d. at 35. Education does bear a 
close relationship to other rights, such as the effective exercise of first amendment free-
doms and the right to vote. [d. However, elevating education to a fundamental right 
would exceed the Court's judicial competence and authority. [d. at 31, 36. It is not the 
Court's function to guarantee citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed 
electoral choices. [d. at 36. 
90. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (statute granted welfare benefits to 
eligible families based on their 'standard of need' but imposed maximum grant limits of 
$250 per month per family regardless of family size or need). In Dandridge, the Court 
found that the regulation did not affect any freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
[d. at 484. Thus, the Court found that the receipt of welfare benefits is not a fundamen-
tal right. See id. at 484 (plaintiff claimed the regulation violated the fourteenth amend-
ment only because it resulted in some disparity in payments to the largest families). In 
the area of social and economic regulation, a state simply had to provide a reasonable 
basis for the regulation. [d. at 485. Although the regulation was imperfect, the state did 
not violate equal protection simply because of some disparity in the classifications. [d. 
91. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 45, 74 (1972). In Lindsey, the Court noted 
the importance of safe and sanitary housing. [d. However, the Constitution does not 
provide protection or remedies for all social and economic ills. [d. No constitutional 
guarantee exists which provides for access to dwellings of a particular quality or a ten-
ant's right to occupy a landlord's real property beyond the lease term without paying 
rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the agreement. [d. Absent constitutional man-
date, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relation-
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2. Heightened Scrutiny 
A classification is constitutional under heightened scrutiny 
if it serves important governmental objectives92 and is substan-
tially related to achieving those objectives.93 Heightened scru-
ships are legislative functions and not fundamental rights. Id. 
92. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (Military Selective Service 
Act requiring the registration of males but not females for possible military service up-
held; interest was in developing a pool of potential combat troops). See also Michael M. 
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470 (1981) (plurality opinion) (statutory rape law pun-
ishing the male, but not female, participant in intercourse when the female was not 18 
years of age and not married to the male). In Michael M. the state's interest in prevent-
ing illegitimate teenage pregnancies was upheld as a strong state interest. Id.; Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 191-92 (1976) (Oklahoma statutee prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer 
to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18). In Craig, the state's 
interest was in the enhancement of traffic safety. Id. at 199. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71,76-77 (1971) (statute required the appointment of men over women as estate admin-
istrators). In Reed, an early review of a gender classification, the Court found that under 
the lesser rationality review, the state's interest in avoiding intra-family controversy and 
administrative ease and convenience was an arbitrary legislative choice. Id. at 76. Under 
heightened scrutiny, the state was not justified in eliminating a class of contests through 
such a gender classification. Id. at 77. 
The Court has also reviewed governmental objectives vis-a-vis illegitimacy classifica-
tions. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 6 (1983) (state interest in preventing the litiga-
tion of stale or fraudulent paternity claims); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 
(1982) (prohibition same as in Pickett, except time period of one year; state interest in 
preventing litigation of stale or fraudulent claims); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265, 271 
(1978) (plurality opinion) (upholding a state statute which allowed an illegitimate child 
to inherit from his intestate father only if a court of competent jurisdiction had, during 
the father's life, entered an order declaring paternity; interest in encouraging legitimate 
family relationships and maintaining accurate and efficient method of disposing dece-
dent's property); see also Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 
1287 n.14. 
93. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79. In Rostker, the Court observed a high degree of 
deference to Congress in military affairs in finding that gender classification was not 
invidious. Id. at 65; Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472-73 (statute sufficiently related to Cali-
fornia's objective in preventing teenage pregnancy); ct. Craig, 429 U.S. at 200-04 (state 
statistics showing that males are substantially more likely to drive under the influence of 
alcohol held insufficient to support the conclusion that gender based discrimination 
closely serves to achieve the state's objectives). 
The Court has also examined illegitimacy classifications. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271-72, 
275-76 (statute substantially related to state's interest in ensuring the accuracy and effi-
cient disposal of an intestate decedent's property as delay and uncertainty are minimized 
where the rights of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of judicial 
record before the administration commences; fraudulent assertions of paternity are less 
likely to succeed if a paternity suit is brought before a court of law while the decedent is 
alive); cf. Pickett, 462 U.S. at 14-15 (no substantial relation between two year limitation 
period for bringing paternity claims and state's interest in preventing stale claims as 
illegitimate children who were public charges could have paternity and support suits 
brought at any time prior to the child's 18th birthday); Mills, 456 U.S. at 101 (no sub-
stantial relationship as evidence essential to paternity actions does not disappear within 
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tiny is given to illegitimacy94 and gender91i classifications. The 
Court affords these classes heightened scrutiny as such charac-
terizations are generally archaic and overbroad.96 
3. Rational Review 
All other classifications are given rational basis scrutiny.97 
Such classifications are constitutional if the classification IS ra-
tionally related98 to a legitimate state interest.99 
the time period). 
94. See, e.g., Pickett, 462 U.S. at 8 (classifications based on legitimacy are subject to 
a heightened level of scrutiny); Mills, 456 U.S. at 99 (restrictions must be substantially 
related to a legitimate state interest); Cf, Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 (illegitimacy classification 
upheld). 
95. See Rostker, 453 U.S: at 69 (heightened scrutiny applied to gender based dis-
crimination); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469, 472-73; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (gender classifi-
cations must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related 
to achievement of those objectives). 
The Supreme Court's extension of heightened scrutiny to non-racial classifications 
such as gender has been questioned. R. BORK, supra note 59, at 66. Former Judge Bork 
has observed the equal protection clause does not forbid virtually all classifications based 
on gender as it forbids all classifications that disfavor racial minorities. See id. The ra-
tifiers of the fourteenth amendment did not think racial and sexual groups needed spe-
cial protection to the same degree. Id. 
96. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) 
(statute provided for 13 years of commissioned service for female naval officers and only 
nine years for males before a mandatory discharge for want of a promotion». The Court 
will invalidate a classification where there is a weak relationship between gender and the 
characteristic or trait that gender supposedly represents. Id. at 199. Providing gender 
classifications heightened review is based on an uncertain rationale. See Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Sex frequently provides no sensible ground for 
differential treatment. Id. Former Justice Brennan would impose strict scrutiny as gen-
der based discrimination is similar to racial discrimination. See id. at 686-88. 
See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). In Weinberger, the Court 
found that the inconsistent payment of survivor's benefits were pernicious classifications 
which deprived women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of 
their employment. Id. at 645. The Constitution forbids gender based differentiation 
based upon a dependency assumption that when a woman dies her family will require 
less protection. Id. 
97. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1954) (the 
general rule is that legislation is presumed valid). 
98. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The state may not rely on classifications 
whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbi-
trary or irrational. I d. at 446. 
Under this standard of review, legislation is usually found rationally related to the 
state interest. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 642 (1986) (classification rationally 
related to interest in preventing fraud, mistake, and ensuring cost-effectiveness as close 
relatives sharing a home tend to purchase and prepare meals together while distant rela-
tives and unrelated individuals might not); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 237-38 
(1981) (Congress declined to grant supplemental income benefits to otherwise eligible 
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mentally ill patients if they were 21 through 64 years of age and confined in public insti-
tutions not receiving Medicaid funds for their care; such allowances were afforded to 
inmates of public institutions that received Medicaid funds for their care). In Schweiker, 
the Court found that the exclusion was rationally related to Congress's interest in avoid-
ing duplicative spending as Congress can legitimately assume the States would or should 
continue to have primary responsibility for providing equivalent funds or basic care. Id. 
at 237. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 176-78 (1980) (classifica-
tions rationally related to interest in the financial integrity of the Railroad Retirement 
system as Congress could properly conclude that persons who had actually acquired stat-
utory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the industry had a greater 
equitable claim to benefits than members of the class who were no longer employed 
when they became eligible for dual benefits); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 
(1979) (statute rationally related to preserving the political community as it was care-
fully framed so as to exclude only those aliens who demonstrated their unwillingness to 
obtain United States citizenship; the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, in effect, 
chose to classify themselves). 
However, legislation has been found irrational under this standard. See City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (the record contained no evidence that the proposed group 
home posed any threat to the city's legitimate interest as applied); Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 57, 61 (1982) (Alaska statutory scheme distributed income derived from natural 
resources to adult citizens in varying amounts based on the length of each citizen's resi-
dence; a scheme granting greater dividends to persons for their residency during the 21 
years prior to enactment does not rationally serve the state's legitimate interests); see 
also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring, 
addressing the equal protection claim which was not a basis for Justice B1ackmun's sepa-
rate majority opinion) (state statute divided employment discrimination complaints into 
two groups accorded disparate treatment: claims processed within 120 days are given full 
consideration on the merits whereas identical claims that do not receive a hearing within 
120 days are terminated). In Logan, Justice Blackmun observed that terminating poten-
tially meritorious claims does not rationally serve state interests as the length of time it 
takes the unemployment commission to process a claim is unrelated to protecting against 
frivolous claims. Id. at 439-40. 
99. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court has observed many legitimate state 
interests. See Lyng, 477 U.S. at 640 (preventing fraud, mistake, and ensuring cost-effec-
tiveness); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61 (interests in creating a financial incentive for individuals 
to establish and maintain residence in Alaska; encouraging prudent management of the 
fund); Logan, 455 U.S. at 439 (eliminating employment discrimination and protecting 
against unfounded charges of discrimination); Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 237 (avoiding 
spending federal resources on behalf of individuals whose care and treatment are being 
fully provided for by state and local government units); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174 (insuring 
the solvency of the railroad retirement system and protecting vested benefits); Norwick, 
441 U.S. at 74, 80 (preserving the political community (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 
U.S. 634, 647 (1973»). 
But contra City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (objective of harming politically un-
popular groups is not a legitimate state interest); Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61 (interest in ap-
portioning benefits in recognition of undefined contributions which residents have made 
during their years of residency). 
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C. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CASES INVOLVING HOMOSEXUAL 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
In Bowers v. Hardwick/oo the plaintiff had been charged 
with committing sodomylOl with another adult male in the bed-
room of his home. lo2 The criminal charge was dropped;lo3 how-
ever, the plaintiff challenged the statute as violating his four-
teenth amendment due process rights. lo4 The Court found that 
the Constitution does not confer a right to privacy that extends 
to homosexual conduct;IOIl and that homosexual activity is not a 
fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution. loe 
100. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy challenged as ap-
plied to homosexuals). 
101. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 187-88. Georgia's anti-sodomy statute provided: 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs 
or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one 
person and the mouth or anus of another .... 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 
years .... 
[d. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)). 
102. [d. at 188. 
103. [d. 
104. See id. at 194-96 n.8. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of fundamental rights. The plaintiff brought suit against the attorney general of 
Georgia charging that, as a practicing homosexual, he was in imminent danger of arrest. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188. The plaintiff claimed that homosexual activity was a private 
association beyond the reach of state regulation. See id. at 189-91. 
105. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190. The Court examined the relationship between the 
claimed right and the general right to privacy. See id. at 190-91; see supra notes 80-88 
and accompanying text for discussion of the right to privacy. None of the rights expli-
cated in the privacy cases bear any resemblance or relation to the plaintiff's claimed 
right. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91. The privacy cases do not stand for the notion that 
any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insu-
lated from state proscription. [d. at 191. 
The Court observed that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause does have 
substantive content, subsuming rights not explicitly mentioned in the clause itself. [d. at 
191. Such discovered rights are substantially protected from federal or state proscription 
or regulation. [d. However, the language of the due process clause appears to focus only 
on the processes by which life, liberty or property is taken. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. 
106. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190. The Court found that the right to engage in 
homosexual conduct is neither deeply rooted in our Nation's history nor implicit in our 
concept of liberty. [d. at 191-92 (relying on the tests in Palko v. Connecticut and Moore 
v. East Cleveland). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for discussion of these 
tests. The Court explained that proscriptions against homosexual conduct have ancient 
roots: until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. See also 
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 
40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 525 (1986) [hereinafter Survey of the Right to Privacy]. 
Today, 23 states and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties 
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Therefore, the Court found that the presumed belief of the 
Georgia electorate that homosexuality is immoral was a rational 
basis for criminalizing such conduct,107 
The federal appellate courts have generally held that gay 
plaintiffs are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,los 
for sodomy performed in private between consenting adults: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) 
(1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 
(Michie 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-3505 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
14:89, 14:89.1 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1987); MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. §§ 750.158, .338, .338 (a)-(b) (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); 
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-5-505 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.190 (Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
14-177 (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 
(1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-612 
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1978). A Texas trial court recently held that Texas's 
sodomy statute was unconstitutional. Morales v. Texas, No. 461-898 (200th J. Dist. Mar. 
15, 1991) (per Davis, J.; final judgment granting permanent injunction against enforce-
ment of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989)). See also London, Gay Groups 
Turn to State Courts to Win Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at B6, col. 3. 
The Court in Hardwick concluded that plaintiff's claim was, at best, facetious. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194. The Court also declined to take a broad view as to its author-
ity to "discover" new fundamental rights embedded in the due process clause. [d. The 
Court observed that there has been a repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that 
the Court had placed on the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
[d. at 194-95. The Court warned that "there should be ... great resistance to expand the 
substantive reach of those clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of 
rights deemed to be fundamental." [d. at 195. Otherwise, the Court "necessarily takes to 
itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority." 
[d. The Court comes nearest to illegitimacy when it creates constitutional law that has 
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. [d. at 194. 
107. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196. The Court observed that the law is constantly based 
on notions of morality. [d. Majoritarian sentiments about the morality of homosexuality 
were an adequate basis for the law. See id. 
108. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (Army reserve 
sergeant barred from reenlistment as she was an admitted homosexual), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 1296 (1990). In Ben-Shalom, the Court found that homosexuals do not constitute 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class. [d. See also Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 
97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff 
sought declaratory relief from a Texas statute proscribing "deviate sexual intercourse 
with another individual of the same sex"); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (27 year old Navy petty officer discharged for engaging in homosexual 
conduct with a 19 year old recruit; official Navy policy called for the administrative dis-
charge of any personnel engaging in such conduct). The court in Dronenburg did not 
determine whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but observed that 
the Navy simply had to prove its policy was rationally related to a permissible end. [d.; 
cf. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (Army serviceman 
discharged after Army learned that in the enlisting process, serviceman had falsely rep-
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With respect to disabilities suffered by homosexuals, the District 
of Columbia Circuit observed that the Supreme Court affords 
suspect or quasi-suspect status only when it is "plainly unjustifi-
able" to discriminate invidiously against a particular class. l09 As 
homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right under the due 
process clause and can be criminalized,llo state sponsored dis-
crimination against the gay class cannot consistently be consid-
ered invidious and unjustifiable. I 11 The court noted that dis-
crimination is rarely more apparent than when conduct which 
defines a class is made criminal.1l2 
The circuit courts have generally recognized that homosexu-
als have suffered from a history of discrimination.1l3 The Sev-
resented that he had never engaged in homosexual activities). The court found that a 
classification based on choice of sexual partners is not suspect; even if heightened scru-
tiny were required, the classification was valid because of the Army's compelling interest. 
[d.; see infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases. 
109. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103 (rejected applicant for FBI special agent position chal-
lenged refusal to hire her because of her homosexuality). In Padula, the court observed 
that the Supreme Court's standard for determining whether a classification is justifiable 
is unclear. [d. See supra note 68 for discussion of disabilities suffered by classes seeking 
strict or heightened scrutiny. 
110. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464; See also Woodward, 871 
F.2d at 1076. 
111. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. "It would be quite anomolous [sic] ... to declare 
status defined by conduct ... as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause." [d. See also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (if homosexual conduct may constitu-
tionally be criminalized, homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class); Wood-
ward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (after Hardwick, it cannot logically be asserted that discrimina-
tion against gays is constitutionally infirm); compare pre-Hardwick decisions: Baker, 769 
F.2d at 292 (strong objection to homosexual conduct prevailing in Western culture for 
the past seven centuries); Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92 (citing Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Virginia statute criminalizing pri-
vate consensual homosexual conduct upheld), summarily aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. 
Va. 1975». In Dronenburg, the Court observed that if a statute proscribing homosexual 
conduct in a civilian context is sustainable, then such a regulation is certainly sustaina-
ble in a military context. [d. at 1392. . 
The invalidation of such classifications by lower courts in the face of contrary Su-
preme Court precedent might imperil the lower courts' legitimacy as impartial non-polit-
ical entities. See Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1297. 
112. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103. See also Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (approving the 
rationale of Padula). 
113. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465 (homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimi-
nation, though perhaps now less in degree); see Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (homosexuality 
generates dislike and disapproval among many); cf. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292 (Western 
culture has strongly objected to homosexual conduct for seven centuries). Furthermore, 
violence against homosexuals may be increasing. See, e.g., Goleman, Homophobia: Scien-
tists Find Clues to its Roots, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, Cl, col. 1 (Science Desk); 
Gelman, Bias Crimes Up Slightly This Year, Newsday, May 15, 1990, at 27. 
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enth Circuit found that homosexuals are not politically power-
less. ll4 The Federal Circuit found that homosexuality differs 
fundamentally from those traits that define currently recognized 
suspect and quasi-suspect classes. lllI Homosexuality is primarily 
a behavioral trait1l8 whereas blacks and women exhibit immuta-
ble characteristics. ll7 
The circuit courts that have reviewed the status of gay clas-
sifications have uniformly held that classifications based on sex-
ual preference are reviewed under a rational basis scrutiny.lls A 
114. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 (homosexuals have proven that they are not with-
out growing political power). 
115. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (naval reservist discharged from active duty be-
cause of acknowledged homosexuality). 
116. [d. In Woodward, the court recognized that suspect classes have immutable 
characteristics whereas homosexuality is behavioral in nature. [d. (citing Bowen v. Gil-
liard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (observing that a class is not suspect or quasi-suspect if its 
members do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics». See Rich 
v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff argued that 
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic; the court observed that classifications 
based on choice of sexual partners is not suspect); cf. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (FBI 
agent's declaration that she was a lesbian can be reasonably viewed as reliable evidence 
of a desire and propensity to engage in such conduct; exceptions to such an assumption 
will arise, but such an admission is compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and 
is likely to again engage in such conduct); Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (plaintiff did not 
claim that she did not engage in homosexual conduct; conduct was presumed). In 
Padula, the court did not address whether homosexuals who do not engage in homosex-
ual activity are members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. [d. 
Some authorities, however, consider homosexuality to be an immutable characteris-
tic or, if not immutable, at least extremely difficult to alter. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1616 (2d ed. 1988). See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 
A.2d I, 34 (D.C. 1987) (private Catholic university refused to recognize and financially 
support homosexual student organization; there is no scientific agreement as to the ori-
gins of sexual orientation although sexual orientation may have multiple roots). In Gay 
Rights Coalition, the court observed that it is generally agreed that individual sexual 
orientation develops at least by adolescence. [d. (citing A. BELL. SEXUAL PREFERENCE -
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 186-87, 211, 222 (1981». Homosexuality is as 
deeply ingrained as heterosexuality. [d. (A. BELL, supra, at 190, 211, 222). There is no 
reliable evidence that adult homosexual orientation can be "cured." [d. (A. BELL, supra, 
at 217). See also supra note 15. 
117. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076. The Court observed that the conduct or behavior 
of members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect class has no relevance to the identifi-
cation of those groups. [d. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 102 (the immutability of the group's 
identifying trait is also to be considered); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 
729 F.2d 1270, 1273 (lOth Cir. 1984) (statute provided for the dismissal or suspension of 
teachers for engaging in "public homosexual conduct"; classification based on choice of 
sexual partners is not suspect as "only four members of the Supreme Court have viewed 
gender as a suspect classification"), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (l985). 
118. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (deferential standard of review held applica-
ble); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (Navy need not have a compelling interest to justify 
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number of legitimate governmental interests have been ob-
served. The Federal Circuit found that the Navy's interest in 
maintaining order, morale, discipline, and mutual trust and con-
fidence among service members was legitimate. llB The District of 
Columbia Circuit found that the FBI's need to have its agents 
able to work in all fifty states120 and its need to maintain secur-
ity were also legitimate interests.121 The Fifth Circuit observed 
that the implementing of morality is a permissible state 
interest.122 
The same courts have given substantial deference to the 
parties implementing these classifications in finding a rational 
relationship to a legitimate state interest.123 For example, the 
discrimination against gay plaintiff); Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (government laws or prac-
tices must, if challenged, pass the rational basis test); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 
(5th Cir. 1985) (standard of review is whether the statute is rationally related to a legiti- . 
mate state end); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Navy's 
policy must be rationally related to a permissible end); cf. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229 (de-
clined to determine the level of scrutiny as Army's interest compelling); see also Homo-
sexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 45, at 1287. 
119. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076-77 (citing Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398). Other 
legitimate interests include insuring the integrity of the system of rank and command; 
and recruiting and retaining members of the naval services. [d. The court upheld the 
claims court grant of summary judgment to the Navy. [d. See also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d 
465; Rich, 735 F.2d at 1229. 
120. Padula, 822 F.2d at 104. The Court noted that the FBI is a national law en-
forcement agency. [d. 
121. [d. FBI agents perform counterintelligence duties that involve highly classified 
matters relating to national security. [d. 
122. Baker, 769 F.2d at 292. 
123. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 101, 104 (FBI policy considered an applicant's sexual 
orientation as being relevant to employment; sexual orientation may affect an employee's 
susceptibility to compromise or breach of trust). In Padula, the Court found that exclud-
ing homosexuals from the FBI was rationally related to protecting security and main-
taining a flexible work-force. See id. The criminalization of homosexual conduct paired 
with general public disapproval of homosexuality exposes many homosexuals, even 
"open" homosexuals, to risks of blackmail; homosexuals may want to protect their part-
ners if not themselves. See id.; ct. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(CIA employee was discharged after he voluntarily admitted to a superior that he was a 
homosexual). In Doe, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that an agency (the 
CIA) promulgating a regulation would have to justify why such a classification was war-
ranted as being "necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States" - the 
standard required under the governing statute. [d. at 1522. The court reversed and re-
manded the district court's grant of summary judgment as the basis for the CIA's dis-
charge was unclear. [d. at 1521. 
See also Baker, 769 F.2d at 292. In Baker, the court found that the criminalization 
of homosexual conduct was related to the permissible state interest of implementing mo-
rality, as Western culture has strongly objected 'to such conduct for the past seven centu-
ries. See id. The Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion reversed the district court's ruling that 
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Federal Circuit observed that the military is a unique, special-
ized society124 and found that the policy of discharging all homo-
sexuals was rationally related to the Navy's interests.12II Further, 
special deference is afforded to the military in matters involving 
decisions on morale, discipline, composition and the like. us 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clear-
ance Office,127 the Ninth Circuit held that gays are not a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class; thus the proper standard for reviewing 
their equal protection claim was the rational basis standard.128 
The court found that DoD regulations vis-a-vis investigations of 
homosexuals were rationally related to permissible ends.129 The 
equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due pro-
cess clause was not violated.130 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989) was unconstitutional. Id. at 293. 
124. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990). 
125. Id. at 1076-77 (relying on the rationale in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 
(D.C. Cir. 1984». In Dronenburg, the court observed that legislation may implement 
morality. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. But it may be argued that naval regulations, 
unlike legislative acts, must be rationally related not to morality for its own sake but to a 
further end which the Navy is entitled to pursue because of the Navy's assigned func-
tion.ld. 
The court observed that the effects of homosexual conduct within a naval or military 
unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline. Id. Such conduct may 
make personal dealings uncomfortable, enhance the possibility of homosexual seduction, 
raise questions about the even-handedness of superiors' dealings with lower ranks, and 
generate dislike and disapproval among many who find homosexuality morally offensive. 
Id. The court observed that the Navy is not required to produce social science data or 
results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and common experience 
demonstrate. Id. Requiring discharge for homosexual conduct is a rational means of 
achieving the Navy's legitimate interests. Id. 
126. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1077 (noting that a court should not substitute its view 
for the professional judgment of the Armed Forces). 
127. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th 
Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990). The Ninth Circuit reviewed denovo the 
district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id. at 570. See High Tech 
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
Denovo is defined: anew; afresh; a second time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (5th ed. 
1981). 
128. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. 
129. Id. at 576. 
130. Id. at 575-76. The court observed the general rule that "legislation ... will be 
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
[governmental] interest." Id. at 575 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985». 
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The court first acknowledged that the plaintiffs were enti-
tled to equal protection under the "equal protection component" 
of the fifth amendment's due process clause. l3l However, the 
court observed that under Bowers u. Hardwick, the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause does not afford homosexuals a funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual conduct.132 Therefore, the 
court determined that it would be incongruous to find a funda-
mental right of homosexual conduct under equal protection 
analysis,133 as equal protection guarantees provided by the fifth 
amendment are simply a component of the fifth amendment's 
due process clause.134 Accordingly, the court found that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to heightened scrutiny under the 
"impingement of a fundamental right" prong of equal protection 
claims. 13G 
The court proceeded to review whether homosexuals consti-
tute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, which would require appli-
131. [d. at 570. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the plaintiffs' claim as if the court was 
analyzing a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim. [d. at 570-71. 
132. [d. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986». Specifically, ho-
mosexual sodomy can be criminalized without violating due process. [d. (citing Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. at 194-96). 
133. [d. at 571. The court noted Hardwick's admonition that there should be great 
resistance to expanding the substantive reach of the due process clause. [d. See supra 
note 106. 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court has never held homosexuality 
to a heightened standard of review. [d. at 572. However, prior decisions of the Ninth 
Circuit had so held. [d. at 572-73 (citing Hatheway v. Secretary of Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 
1378 (9th Cir.) (gay Army lieutenant convicted of sodomy by a general court-martial 
under Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 
(1981) and Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (Navy regulations prohib-
ited Navy personnel from engaging in homosexual acts; following administrative dis-
charge and review by the Secretary of the Navy for admitting to homosexual acts, en-
listed personnel challenged constitutionality of regulations and proceedings». In 
Hatheway, the court applied heightened scrutiny review as the "classification penalize[dl 
the exercise of a fundamental right." Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382, 1382 n.6. The court in 
Hatheway did not reach the question of whether homosexuals were a suspect or quasi-
suspect class. Id. In Beller, the court found that, under a substantive due process claim, 
the classification should be reviewed under a standard somewhere between the rational 
relation and strict scrutiny standards. Beller, 632 F.2d at 807-09. 
These pre-Hardwick decisions were based on Supreme Court precedent which, at 
the time, suggested that some forms of government regulation of private consensual ho-
mosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge. High Tech Gays, 895 
F.2d at 572 n.7 (citing Beller, 632 F.2d at 810). These prior decisions were overruled by 
Hardwick. Id. at 572. Therefore, neither Beller nor Hatheway is binding authority re-
garding heightened scrutiny for classifications based on homosexuality. [d. 
134. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d. at 571. 
135. [d. 
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cation of a heightened level of scrutiny.IS8 Initially, the court ob-
served that homosexuals cannot be accorded suspect or quasi-
suspect status as homosexual conduct can be criminalized.137 
Further relying, in part, on the test for suspectness articulated 
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,188 the court found 
that homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination.139 
However, homosexuals have political clout as state legislation 
has addressed discrimination against homosexuals. 1'0 
The court also observed that homosexuality is not an immu-
table characteristic but is behavioral. lU Therefore, homosexual-
ity is fundamentally different from the traits associated with 
race, gender, or alienage,,'2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that 
homosexuals do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect classH3 
and regulations which discriminate against gays are reviewed us-
ing rational basis scrutiny. I" 
Applying rational review, the court found that ensuring na-
tional security was a permissible goal for the DoD.HlI Further, 
the DoD's investigatory pOlicyU8 and resulting procedures vis-a-
136. [d. at 571·74. 
137. [d. at 571. 
138. [d. at 573 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard. 483 U.S. 587, 602·03 (1987) (the "saddled 
with disabilities" test was not addressed»; See supra notes 65· 71 and accompanying text 
for discussion of Rodriguez. 
139. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. 
140. [d. at 574 n.10 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31·395 (West 1988) (barring em· 
ployment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7 (West 
1984) (barring violence against persons or property based on sexual orientation); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 333.20201(2)(a) (West 1984) (barring denial of care in health facili-
ties on the basis of sexual orientation». 
141. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. 
142. [d. The behavior of already recognized suspect or quasi·suspect classes is irrele-
vant to their identification. [d. at 573·74. 
143. [d. at 571, 574. 
144. [d. at 570·71. 
145. See id. at 578 (citing Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) 
(employee was removed for cause from a submarine facility after the Navy denied him a 
required security clearance; on appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Board, 
in reversing the Navy's decision, found that it had authority to review the merits of the 
underlying security clearance determination and that the Navy had failed to show its 
determination was reasonable». In Egan, the Court found that both the DoD and agency 
heads have a legitimate interest in national security and in protecting classified informa-
tion. See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528·29. 
146. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576·77. The court observed that the DoD's policy 
was essentially as follows: The head of a government agency who must bear the responsi· 
bility for protecting classified information in his custody should have the final say in 
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vis homosexuals147 were rationally related to this end. The DoD 
proffered sufficient evidenceu8 that hostile intelligence services 
target homosexuals to obtain classified information. U9 The 
deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information. 
[d. at 578 (citing Egan, 484 U.S. at 529). Consequently, those with sufficient expertise 
must try and predict who is vulnerable to counterintelligence efforts. See id. at 577. The 
court found that in predicting who is vulnerable to foreign intelligence activities, it is 
rational to try and determine what groups will be targeted. See id. Once it is determined 
who is targeted, applications for security clearances are designed to elicit the information 
necessary for determining if the applicant has characteristics of the targeted groups. See 
id. Expanded investigations of applicants falling within a targeted group help determine 
whether they are susceptible to coercion or vulnerable to hostile intelligence efforts. [d. 
The counterintelligence service's reasons for targeting the group, even if based on contino 
uing ignorance or prejudice, are irrelevant. [d. at 578. 
The court recognized that attempting to define an individual's future actions and 
the actions of outside and unknown influences is an inexact science at best. [d. at 577-78. 
A court must afford special deference to the executive branch when adjudicating matters 
involving their decisions on protecting classified information. Id. at 576. 
The DoD's other justifications for its policies, that homosexuals may be emotionally 
unstable and that homosexual conduct may be criminal, were not addressed. [d. at 578 
n.13. The Ninth Circuit deemed it unnecessary to do so as the targeting of homosexuals 
by foreign intelligence agencies is sufficient justification for the expanded investigations. 
[d. 
147. See supra notes 38·41 and accompanying text for the DoD's policies relating to 
homosexual applicants. As discussed supra note 146, expanded investigations help deter-
mine if the applicant is susceptible to coercion, blackmail, or vulnerable to counterintel-
ligence efforts. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576. 
148. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576 (discussing the cross-motions for summary 
judgment). The cotirt found that the DoD had met its burden of persuasion. [d. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demon-
strating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 
477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (nonprofit corporation, a "citizens' lobby," alleged that certain 
statements in petitioner's magazine were false and derogatory). Once the moving party 
satisfies this burden, the opponent must marshal specific facts showing that a genuine 
issue for trial remains. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
If the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion at trial, the party moving for 
summary judgment may satisfy its burden of production under Rule 56 by submitting 
affirmative evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or by 
demonstrating to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to estab-
lish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (wrongful death action alleged to have resulted from exposure to 
asbestos products manufactured by defendants). 
In a review of a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views the materials 
on file in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 
818 (9th Cir. 1986) (California Franchise Tax Board served withholding notices on an 
Employee Welfare Benefit Plan in an attempt to collect delinquent personal income 
taxes of fund participants; the Plan sought declaratory judgment prohibiting the service 
of these notices as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 preempted the 
statute under which the Franchise Tax Board served the notices). 
149. High'Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 576-77. See supra note 15 enumerating the DoD's 
proffered evidence demonstrating that homosexuals are targeted by hostile intelligence 
agencies. 
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plaintiffs failed to show that the DoD did not have a rational 
basis for its expanded security investigations of homosexuals. 1110 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs and remanded to 
the district court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the 
DoD.m 
V. CRITIQUE 
In High Tech Gays,t1l2 the Ninth Circuit found that homo-
sexual conduct was not a fundamental right under the equal 
protection component of the fifth amendment's due process 
clause,1113 which was consistent with Supreme Court precedent 
established in Bowers u. Hardwick. In the instant case, the 
Ninth Circuit properly explained that it is not possible to infer 
that the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's 
150. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575. The Ninth Circuit observed that plaintiffs' 
proffered evidence did not raise genuine issues as to any fact material to the alleged 
constitutional violation but merely raise an issue as to the alleged irrationality of the 
KGB's opinion regarding homosexual behavior. [d. at 578. The plaintiffs evidence did 
not adequately address whether homosexuals, in fact, are targeted by counterintelligence 
agencies. [d.; see supra note 15 enumerating plai\ltiffs proffered evidence demonstrating 
that the DoD's policies are irrational. For example, the Senate subcommittee hearings 
cited by the plaintiffs involved a limited number of cases and was not a study of all 
significant cases involving homosexuals. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575. Further, one 
of the cases pointed out that homosexuals are targeted by the KGB. [d. The court dis-
missed the depositions of Richard Olinger because of the li~ited agenda of the confer· 
ences he attended. [d. at 575-76. 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs first amendment claim as the plaintiffs did not 
allege that any gay person had been denied a security clearance or had been subjected to 
an expanded investigation based solely, as a distinct abstract ground, on membership in 
a gay organization. [d. at 580. 
151. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 581. 
152. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th 
Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990). 
153. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571. See supra note 110-11 and accompanying 
text for appellate decisions agreeing that homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right. 
The Ninth Circuit appeared to heed the Supreme Court's warning in Hardwick: that 
court's are most vulnerable and come nearest to illegitimacy when they deal with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of 
the Constitution, especially where they redefine the category of rights deemed to be fun· 
damental. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986). See also Woodward v. 
United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990). The 
court in Woodward observed that "[ilf it is in any degree doubtful that the Supreme 
Court should freely create new constitutional rights, ... it is certain that lower courts 
should not do so." [d. at 1075 (emphasis added) (citing Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 
1388, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text for discus· 
sion of appellate court decisions. 
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due process clause could independently protect homosexual ac-
tivity when the same due process clause itself does not recognize 
homosexuality as a fundamental right. 11I4 
The Ninth Circuit aligned itself with other circuits in find-
ing that gays do not constitute a suspect or quasi-s~spect 
class. 11I1I The court recognized the contradiction that would arise 
were a heightened class status granted: a state could constitu-
tionally criminalize homosexual sodomyl1l6 while state courts ad-
judicating equal protection claims would be compelled to invali-
date such classifications. 1117 The possibility of such an 
implausible contradiction was sufficient to deny heightened 
scrutiny to homosexuals. 
Through application of the Rodriguez tests,11I8 the Ninth 
Circuit determined that it would have denied heightened scru-
tiny irrespective of Hardwick. The court conceded that homo-
sexuals have suffered a history of discrimination,11I9 but relied in 
part on gay's political clout in denying them heightened scru-
154. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text; notes 100-07 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick. This finding was also consistent with and 
explained the post-Hardwick decisions by other circuits. See supra notes 109-12 and 
accompanying text. Other circuits have simply noted that as homosexual conduct can be 
criminalized, homosexuals cannot be afforded heightened scrutiny. [d. 
The Ninth Circuit appeared to reject the district court's holding that some forms of 
homosexual conduct are protected as fundamental rights under the general right of pri-
vacy. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571; see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text for discussion' of Bowers v. 
Hardwick. 
157. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for background discussion of 
this recognized incongruity. 
158. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; notes 138-41 and accompanying 
text for the Ninth Circuit's application of Rodriguez. 
159. See supra note 138-39 and accompanying text. This finding was consistent with 
findings of other courts that have dealt with the issue. See supra note 113 and accompa-
nying text. Such a proposition hardly needs further discussion except to make a few brief 
observations: The courts and the legislatures generally do not look favorably upon gay 
interests. See Survey of the Right to Privacy, supra note 106, at 524. See, e.g., National 
Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (state statute provid-
ing for the dismissal or suspension of teachers for engaging in public homosexual conduct 
upheld), aff'd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985). 
Further, as of this writing, private consensual sodomy is still a criminal offense in 23 
states and the District of Columbia. See supra note 106 for states still outlawing consen-
sual adult sodomy. Finally, violence against gays appears to be increasing. See supra 
note 113. 
41
Farmer and Johnson: Constitutional Law Summary
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
114 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:81 
tiny.160 However, women have been afforded heightened status 
despite the fact that they have more political power than gays.161 
This suggests that, at least in the context of homosexual classifi-
cations, there is no correlation between lack of political power 
and whether a class is afforded heightened scrutiny.162 
Further, the Ninth Circuit's broad observation that homo-
sexuality is behavioral and not immutable is questionable. 163 
While consistent with circuits that have considered the issue,164 
this observation is contrary to medical and psychological re-
search which suggests that sexual preference may be established 
at an early age.161! As some homosexuals may be born gay or de-
velop their sexual orientation during their formative years, the 
court made too broad a conclusion in declaring that homosexual-
160. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. The court recognized that political 
powerlessness is a characteristic of prior classes who had been granted heightened scru-
tiny.ld. 
161. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting) (homosexuals are regarded by the national parties as 
"political pariahs") denying reh'g to 895 F.2d 563. Judge Canby observed that "[olne can 
easily find examples of major political parties openly tailoring their position to appeal to 
black voters, and to female voters. One cannot find comparable examples of appeals to 
homosexual voters." Id. 
162. Further, the general problem with this part of the Rodriguez test is that it is 
malleable; any court could likely point to a group as having political power and thus 
disqualify them from suspect class status. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1954) (majority found that retarded people were not politi-
cally powerless) (Brennan, J., observed that the only discrimination the Court would 
remedy is the discrimination they alone were "perspicacious enough to see"). 
163. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
164. See .~upra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. Whether the disposition to ho-
mosexuality is an acquired behavioral trait or an inborn (and in a sense, an immutable 
characteristic), the appellate courts' general approach has been to focus on the outward 
behavioral manifestations of homosexual orientation regardless of, what may be termed, 
the "cause" of homosexuality. Id. 
As the court observed in Ben-Shalom, the classifications do not classify based 
merely upon status as a homosexual, but upon a reasonable inference about probable 
conduct in the past and future. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), 
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990). The government does not have to ignore the practical 
reality of the situation, nor be required to police soldiers' personal relationships for evi-
dence of homosexual conduct in order to enforce its regulations. See id. 
The Ninth Circuit did not directly address the district court's conclusion that the 
statute impinged upon homosexual orientation. See supra note 18. Perhaps the court did 
not address the scope of the classification as the 000 policy was rational regardless of 
whether the classification affected homosexual orientation. However, the court's observa-
tion that homosexuality is behavioral indicates a likely rejection of the district court's 
finding; the classifications simply did not impinge upon what may be termed "homosex-
ual orientation." See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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ity is behavioral and not immutable. 
It appears that gays, or at least some classes of gays, would 
substantially satisfy the requirements for heightened class status 
if the court were required to rely solely on the Rodriguez tests. 
Nonetheless, the court did arrive at the proper finding vis-a-vis 
class status: the Rodriguez tests appear to be irrelevant where 
the Supreme Court has held that states can engage in the ulti-
mate discrimination - criminalizing the particular conduct that 
defines the class. As a state can criminalize homosexual conduct 
without violating the due process clause, it is but an intellectual 
exercise in the review of similar classifications to determine 
whether homosexuality is an innate characteristic or whether 
homosexuals have political power.166 Irrespective of the proper 
answer to these issues, the Supreme Court has found that such 
discrimination is constitutional,l67 In the instant case, the al-
leged discrimination was considerably less severe than criminal-
izing homosexual conduct. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should 
have recognized that Rodriguez was inapplicable in reaching its 
decision to deny heightened scrutiny to homosexuals. 
The Ninth Circuit's brief recognition of the DoD's interest 
166. The post-Bowers federal appellate court opinions may have implicitly recog-
nized this proposition. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (if 
homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals are not en-
titled to greater than rational basis scrutiny), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Wood-
ward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the rationale 
in Padula v. Webster), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 
97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (if the Supreme Court is unwilling to invalidate laws that 
criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is not an option for a lower court to 
conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious). However, 
these decisions also applied various parts of the Rodriguez tests. See supra notes 114-17. 
Alternatively, High Tech Gays and the other federal appellate court decisions could 
signify a general decline in the utility of the Rodriguez tests. With respect to homosexual 
classifications, it is unclear how much weight the courts ultimately afford application of 
the Rodriguez tests. 
167. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bowers v. 
Hardwick. While the Court in Hardwick did not address the issue of why gays engage in 
such conduct, the Court impliedly found that it does not matter as long as a state has a 
rational basis for the law. The presumed beliefs of the majority of the Georgia electorate 
that homosexuality is immoral was sufficient. Had the Court thought immutability im-
portant, it likely would have addressed the issue as anti-sodomy statutes do not make 
exceptions for those immutably disposed to homosexuality. 
Likewise, the amount of political power that gays have was also irrelevant to the 
Court's holdings in Hardwick. Therefore, the question of whether homosexuals have po-
litical clout is only important to the extent gays can assert their interests in the state, 
local and federal legislatures. 
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in national security as compelling is consistent with other cir-
cuits. lsS Finding that being the rationale for the classification 
was sound is consistent with the outcomes in other circuits, a 
seeming fait accomplils9 although some courts have warned 
against thinking SO.170 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit placed itself in accord with other circuits 
with respect to the class status of homosexuals for equal protec-
tion purposes. The rationality standard is appropriate as there is 
no constitutional basis for affording heightened scrutiny. Gays 
will have to rely upon the legislature to advance their interests 
as classifications affecting them will usually withstand the ra-
tional review standard as evidenced by this ruling. 
Having decided that the lowest standard is constitutionally 
required, there remains the question as to the overall merit of 
the national security policy.l7l As the Ninth Circuit recognized 
in Beller v. Middendorf: 
Upholding the challenged regulations as constitu-
tional is distinct from a statement that they are 
168. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. It is beyond question that the gov-
ernment has a substantial interest in national security. 
169. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text. As the plaintiffs failed to prove 
homosexuals were not targeted, their only alternative was to prove the articulated policy 
erroneous. They had to show that the DoD's policy was not rationally related to its inter-
ests or that there was some fallacy in the DoD's justification. See High Tech Gays v. 
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 576 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the 
DoD's two-step analysis). 
For example, the court implied that the DoD, in predicting who is vulnerable to 
foreign intelligence activities, rationally tries to determine who is targeted. Id. at 577. 
Any plaintiff challenging DoD classifications would have difficulty rebutting the conten-
tion that it is rational to try and determine who is targeted. The consequences of such a 
rebuttal would likely mean that the government could not use any information received 
regarding groups targeted by such foreign agencies. 
As the activity of intelligence networks in east-block countries declines, the DoD's 
rationale for expanded investigations may decline in validity or importance; however, 
intelligence activities by foreign intelligence services may be expanding. See, e.g., CIA 
Chief Says Soviet Spying is on Rise, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at 6, pt. A. 
170. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (simply be-
cause homosexual conduct can be criminalized does not mean that any negative state 
action is constitutionally authorized; laws or government practices must be justified in 
terms of some government purpose). 
171. See supra notes 35-41 for discussion of the I;>oD's investigatory policy vis-a-vis 
homosexuals. 
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wise. The latter judgment is neither implicit m 
our decision nor within our province to 
make .... 172 
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172. 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J.) (See supra note 133). An analy-
sis of whether the regulations in question strike the proper balance between the need to 
protect national security and the need to prevent unwarranted infringements on individ-
ual liberties is beyond the scope of this Note. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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